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WHEN DEATH BECOMES MURDER:
A PRIMER ON EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLING
William J. Aceves*
ABSTRACT
International law prohibits the arbitrary deprivation of life,
which includes extrajudicial killing. This norm is codified in every
major human rights treaty and has attained jus cogens status as a
non-derogable norm in international law. In the United States, the
Torture Victim Protection Act ("TVPA") establishes civil liability for
extrajudicial killing. As evidenced in the TVPA's text and legislative
history, the definition of extrajudicial killing is based on international
law. Despite the clear meaning of the TVPA's text and the clarity of
international law, the TVPA's definition of extrajudicial killing is still
contested in litigation, and some courts express uncertainty about
its meaning. This raises a simple question: what constitutes an
extrajudicial killing? This Article reviews the status of extrajudicial
killing and clarifies its discrete elements under international law. It
then considers the status of extrajudicial killings in the case of Mamani
v. Berzain, a TVPA case involving the responsibility of the former
President and Defense Minister of Bolivia for the killing of civilians in
a 2003 government crackdown.
* William J. Aceves is the Dean Steven R. Smith Professor of Law at
California Western School of Law. Professor Aceves submitted an expert
declaration to the federal district court for the Southern District of Florida and an
amicus brief to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals on behalf of the plaintiffs in
the Mamani litigation. Regina Calvario, Warsame Hassan, and Melia Thompson-
Dudiak provided excellent research assistance. All errors and opinions are the
author's sole responsibility.
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INTRODUCTION
The execution of a political prisoner; the murder of a civilian
through indiscriminate attacks on her village; the killing of a soldier
who is hors de combat-each of these deaths constitutes an
extrajudicial killing.1 There are, of course, some instances when a
death does not rise to the level of an unlawful killing.2 But, these
deaths are not lawful. They are inhumane, unnecessary, and
illegitimate. They fail to comply with the most basic principles of
humanity and offer no due process to victims-no opportunity to
defend themselves through the rule of law. Because of this,
extrajudicial killings represent an arbitrary deprivation of life. They
constitute the raison d'tre for the human rights framework
established after the Second World War.
3
The right to life and the corollary right to be free from the
arbitrary deprivation of life represent the defining human right. This
norm is now codified in every major human rights treaty and has
attained jus cogens status as a non-derogable norm that binds all
1. See generally NIGEL RODLEY & MATT POLLARD, THE TREATMENT OF
PRISONERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 246-78 (3d ed. 2009) (describing and
explaining the various types of "extra-legal executions" and their consequences);
EMILY CRAWFORD, THE TREATMENT OF COMBATANTS AND INSURGENTS UNDER THE
LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 31-37 (2010) (explaining the principals used to
distinguish lawful and unlawful actions).
2. For example, capital punishment is not specifically prohibited under
international law even though it is subject to extensive criticism. See generally
WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW (3d ed. 2003) (analyzing the universal norms, developments, and regional
approaches surrounding the abolition of the death penalty). It is prohibited by some
regional human rights treaties as well as the Second Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. See Protocol No. 13 to the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty in all Circumstances, art. 1, Mar. 5,
2002, E.T.S. 187; Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish
the Death Penalty, art. 1, June 8, 1990, O.A.S.T.S. 73; Second Optional Protocol to
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition
of the Death Penalty, Dec. 15, 1989, 1642 U.N.T.S. 414, 415.
3. See generally Franciszek Przetacznik, The Right to Life as a Basic Human
Right, 9 REV. DES DROITS DE L'HOMME 585 (1976) (noting that the Second World
War "caused intensive regulation of human rights by way of international
instruments, such as the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the
1966 Covenants on Human Rights adopted by the General Assembly of the United
Nations.").
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states.4 The prohibition against extrajudicial killing is an extension
of the right to life norm. It applies in times of peace and places strict
limits on the use of force by law enforcement and security personnel.5
It also applies in times of armed conflict as evidenced by its codification
as a basic principle of international humanitarian law. 6 It can give
rise to individual criminal responsibility and state responsibility in
national courts as well as international criminal tribunals.7 Few norms
have generated greater consensus.
In the United States, the Torture Victim Protection Act
("TVPA") establishes civil liability for extrajudicial killings as well
as torture.8 The TVPA defines extrajudicial killing by reference to
international law.' Despite overwhelming international consensus, the
definition of extrajudicial killing has been contested in litigation. 10
4. See, e.g., Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 29, 1 11, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.I/Add.11 (Aug. 31, 2001) (asserting the peremptory nature of the
"right to life" provisions in the ICCPR); Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No.
24, 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (Nov. 11, 1994) (listing the arbitrary
deprivation of life as an example of a peremptory norm).
5. See generally THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (B.G.
Ramcharan ed. 1985) (analyzing the right to life in multiple dimensions of
international law).
6. See generally IAN PARK, THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN ARMED CONFLICT (2018);
WEIGHING LIvEs IN WAR (Jens David Ohlin et al. eds., 2017).
7. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature
July 17, 1998, art. 25, 37 I.L.M. 999, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force July 1,
2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute] (detailing individual criminal responsibility for
violations of the Rome Statute).
8. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73(1992). See Rachael E. Schwartz, "And Tomorrow?" The Torture Victim Protection
Act, 11 ARiz J. INT'L & COMP. L. 271,273-74 (1994); see generally Yoav Gery, Note,
The Torture Victim Protection Act: Raising Issues of Legitimacy, 26 GEO. WASH. J.
INT'L L. & ECON. 597 (1993) (discussing the history and provisions of the TVPA and
examining relevant international law); Kathryn L. Pryor, Note, Does the Torture
Victim Protection Act Signal the Imminent Demise of the Alien Tort Claims Act?,
29 VA. J. INT'L L. 969 (1989) (discussing the impact of the TVPA on the Alien Torts
Claims Act and comparing the two pieces of legislation); Matthew H. Murray, Note,
The Torture Victim Protection Act: Legislation to Promote Enforcement of the
Human Rights of Aliens in U.S. Courts, 25 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 673 (1987)
(examining the TVPA and advocating for its passage).
9. See Jennifer Correale, The Torture Victim Protection Act: A Vital
Contribution to International Human Rights Enforcement or Just a Nice Gesture?,
5 PACE INT'L L. REV. 197, 208 (1994); Christopher W. Haffke, The Torture Victim
Protection Act: More Symbol than Substance, 43 EMORY L.J. 1467, 1479 (1994).
10. However, there are many cases where courts have established that victims
were subjected to extrajudicial killing under the TVPA. See, e.g., Cabello v.
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As noted by one federal court, "it is not clear what constitutes an
extrajudicial killing."1" This perceived lack of clarity stems, in part,
from the failure to conduct a robust review of international law and its
constitutive sources.
It is true that no treaty specifically defines extrajudicial
killing. 12 But numerous international sources offer details on this
well-established norm. To understand the meaning of extrajudicial
killing, therefore, courts must engage in a more rigorous analysis of
international sources, including the decisions of human rights courts
and the statements of human rights bodies. 13 Such a review would
reveal the right to life norm affords broad protection against the
arbitrary deprivation of life. It would reveal that the prohibition
against extrajudicial killing represents one formulation of this norm.14
It would also reveal the enumerated elements of this norm. While
some courts have asserted that an extrajudicial killing requires a
"deliberated killing," this statement does not capture the full range of
behavior that can give rise to responsibility under international law.
This Article reviews the status of extrajudicial killing and
clarifies its discrete elements under international law. Part I reviews
the definition of extrajudicial killing presented in the TVPA. Because
the TVPA's legislative history and text rely upon international law,
Part II examines the prohibition against extrajudicial killing under
Fernandez-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148 (11th Cir. 2005); Doe v. Saravia, 348 F. Supp. 2d
1112 (E.D. Cal. 2004); Tachiona v. Mugabe, 234 F. Supp. 2d 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2002);
Mushikiwabo v. Barayagwiza, 1996 WL 164496 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 1996).
11. Mamani v. Berzain, 2009 WL 10664387, at *15 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 25, 2009).
See also Mamani v. Berzain, 654 F.3d 1148, 1155-57 (11th Cir. 2011) (reversing the
district court's denial of the motion to dismiss the claims and stating that the
killings must be "deliberate" to meet the minimal requirements for extrajudicial
killings).
12. See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 456 F.Supp. 2d 457, 465
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) ("Plaintiffs have not directed the Court to any international
authority establishing the elements of extrajudicial killing, and the Court is aware
of none.").
13. Cf. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 301 (2d ed. 1999) ("The customary practice of
states ... reveals that murder is not intended to mean only those specific
intentional killings without lawful justification. Instead, state practice views
murder in its largo senso meaning as including the creation of life-endangering
conditions likely to result in death according to reasonable human experience.").
14. Other formulations of the norm include extrajudicial execution,
summary execution, summary killing, willful killing, unlawful killing, arbitrary
deprivation of life, and murder.
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international law and considers its status in both human rights law
and international humanitarian law. Based on this review, Part III
offers a detailed definition by reaching beyond treaty provisions to
consider the decisions of human rights courts and other international
bodies. It establishes that the prohibition against extrajudicial killing
includes both substantive and procedural components. Part IV reviews
the contested nature of extrajudicial killing in Mamani v. Berzain, a
recent TVPA case involving the responsibility of the former President
and Defense Minister of Bolivia for the killing of dozens of civilians
in a 2003 government crackdown. 15 The Mamani litigation offers an
instructive (yet puzzling) narrative on how some federal courts assess
claims of extrajudicial killing. Finally, Part V examines the claims of
extrajudicial killing in Mamani through the framework of established
international law and practice.
While this Article considers the TVPA, the benefits of clarifying
the meaning of extrajudicial killing extend well beyond the TVPA.
Claims of extrajudicial killing can also be brought under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA") and the Alien Tort Statute
("ATS"). 16 Courts routinely cross-reference case law from these
statutes when interpreting the meaning of extrajudicial killing. Thus,
a clear understanding of extrajudicial killing will affect the application
of several federal statutes. At the same time, the TVPA is unique in
its scope and application. The FSIA is only available against foreign
governments, and the Supreme Court has significantly curtailed the
availability of ATS relief. 17 Accordingly, the TVPA is an important
mechanism for human rights victims seeking redress for extrajudicial
killing. A clear explanation of what constitutes an extrajudicial killing
is essential for affirming this fundamental norm and protecting it from
diminution. Ensuring the TVPA's provisions are well-understood and
correctly applied has now become even more important.
15. Mamani v. Berzain, 654 F.3d 1148, 1150-51 (11th Cir. 2011). See Curt
Anderson, U.S. Court Finds Former Bolivian President Responsible for Civilian
Deaths, TIME (Apr. 4, 2018), http://amp.timeinc.net/time/5227151/bolivia-sanchez-
de-lozada-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/3AH7-QQKL; David Ovalle, Landmark Case in
Florida Pits Bolivia's Ex-Leader against Villagers Attacked by His Army, MIAMI
HERALD (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/
americas/article203804364.html [https://perma.cc/E7WY-V9JA].
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2017); 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (2008).
17. See, e.g., Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S.Ct. 1386, 1406 (2018); Kiobel
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 117-18 (2013); Samantar v. Yousuf,
560 U.S. 305, 309 (2010); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004); see
also Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 566 U.S. 449, 453 (2012).
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Though this Article considers extrajudicial killing in the
context of U.S. legislation and litigation, its analysis extends far
beyond our own borders. The prohibition against extrajudicial killing
is an international norm, reflected in treaties and customary
international law. U.S. law and practice can thus influence, and be
influenced by, this fundamental norm.
I. EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLING UNDER THE TORTURE VICTIM
PROTECTION ACT
On March 12, 1992, President George H.W. Bush signed the
TVPA, which was adopted by Congress to implement U.S. obligations
under several international human rights agreements.1 8 The TVPA
commences with the following words: "An Act [t]o carry out obligations
of the United States under the United Nations Charter and other
international agreements pertaining to the protection of human rights
by establishing a civil action for recovery of damages from an
individual who engages in torture or extrajudicial killing." 19 The
legislation culminated a seven-year effort to bolster and extend the
rights provided by the ATS.2 ° While the ATS was limited to claims by
foreign nationals, the TVPA was intended to provide a right of action
to both U.S. citizens and foreign nationals.
The TVPA establishes a cause of action for torture and
extrajudicial killing when such acts are committed by an individual
18. Torture Victim Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992).
19. Id. The TVPA's preamble appears in the original slip law and Statutes
at Large, but it was not included in the United States Code.
20. In 1985, the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association passed
a resolution calling for the adoption of federal legislation establishing a right of
action for torture or extrajudicial killing. The first versions of the TVPA were
introduced in the House and Senate in 1986. See Torture Victim Protection Act of
1989: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 38, 42 (1989)
(statement of Father Robert Drinan, American Bar Association). See generally THE
LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, BRIEFING BOOK: THE TORTURE VICTIM
PROTECTION ACT OF 1986 (1986) (providing a detailed account of Torture Victim
Protection Act of 1986 and the "substantive, procedural, and policy implications" of
the bill); COMM. ON INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS, THE ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF
NEW YORK, TORTURE VICTIM PROTECTION ACT (1987) (providing a detailed account
of Torture Victim Protection Act of 1987 and the "substantive, procedural, and
policy implications" of the bill).
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acting under actual or apparent authority or color of law of any foreign
nation.21 Extrajudicial killing is defined as:
a deliberated killing not authorized by a previous
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court
affording all the judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. Such
term, however, does not include any such killing that,
under international law, is lawfully carried out under
the authority of a foreign nation.22
Significantly, the term "deliberated killing" is undefined in
the statute. Instead, the TVPA indicates which killings are excluded
from the definition of extrajudicial killing. Thus, the TVPA designates
an extrajudicial killing as: (1) a deliberated killing; (2) that is not
authorized; (3) by a previous judgment; (4) pronounced by a regularly
constituted court; and (5) that affords all the judicial guarantees
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. 23 These elements
track Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which
requires States Parties to ensure that protected persons are only
subjected to criminal proceedings that afford "all the judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized
peoples. ' '24
The TVPA's definition of extrajudicial killing also excludes
any killing that "under international law, is lawfully carried out under
the authority of a foreign nation. '25 This provision requires reference
to international law. For example, international law recognizes the
legality of lawful killings committed by privileged combatants in
times of armed conflict. 2 In contrast, international law does not
21. § 2(a), 106 Stat. 73.
22. Id. § 3(a).
23. See id.
24. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, 6, 75 U.N.T.S. 1287 [hereinafter Third Geneva
Convention]. See generally Louise Doswald-Beck, Judicial Guarantees under
Common Article 3, THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS: A COMMENTARY 469 (Andrew
Clapham et al. eds., 2015) (discussing the importance of judicial guarantees during
peacetime as applied to rebel groups).
25. § 3(a), 106 Stat. 73.
26. See generally EMILY CRAWFORD, IDENTIFYING THE ENEMY: CIVILIAN
PARTICIPATION IN ARMED CONFLICT 12-13 (2015) (lawful combatants are entitled
to immunity if their actions are taken in compliance with the laws of armed conflict,
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recognize the legality of killings committed by government forces
against unarmed civilians."
The TVPA's legislative history offers more clarity on the
meaning of extrajudicial killing and reveals the relevance of
international law for purposes of interpreting the statute. Indeed, the
legislative history is replete with references to international law.
28
For example, the 1988 House Report recognized that the TVPA was
proposed "to carry out obligations of the United States under the
United Nations Charter and other international agreements
pertaining to the protection of human rights ... -29 The 1989 House
Report indicated that extrajudicial killing is defined "in accordance
with international standards." 30 It added that "[t]he concept of
'extrajudicial killing' is derived from article 3 common to the four
Geneva Conventions of 1949. "31 The 1991 House Report echoed these
points.32
The Senate's understanding of the TVPA was nearly identical.
The Senate Report indicated that "[tihe TVPA incorporates into
U.S. law the definition of extrajudicial killing found in customary
international law."33 The report added that the definition was drafted
to be consistent with the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 34 Only killings
that violated international law were considered "actionable under the
TVPA."35 Thus, the definition excluded "killings that are lawful under
international law-such as killings by armed forces during declared
including the avoidance of targeting innocent civilians); Mark D. Maxwell &
Richard V. Meyer, The Principle of Distinction: Probing the Limits of its
Customariness, 2007 ARMY LAW. 1 ("Compliance with this concept of distinction is
the fundamental difference between heroic Soldier and murderer.").
27. See generally PROTECTION OF CIViLIANS 141-76 (Haidi Willmot et al.
eds., Oxford University Press 2016) (discussing the protections afforded to civilians
under international human rights and international humanitarian law); THE
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 501-87 (Dieter Fleck ed., 3d.
ed., 2013) (discussing the protection of civilian populations).
28. See, e.g., Torture Victim Protection Act of 1988: Hearing and Markup on
H.R. 1417 Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 100th Cong. (1988) (suggesting
that the standards of international law are well known and that Congress must act
in accordance with the law of nations).
29. H.R. REP. No. 100-693, pt. 1, at 1 (1988).
30. H.R. REP. No. 101-55, pt. 1, at 4 (1989).
31. Id.
32. H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, pt. 1, at 4-5 (1991).
33. S. REP. No. 102-249, at 5 (1991).
34. Id. at 6.
35. Id.
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wars which do not violate the Geneva Convention and killings
necessary to effect a lawful arrest or prevent the escape of a person
lawfully detained. '3 6
The TVPA's legislative history indicates that a "deliberated
killing" encompasses all killings that demonstrate extrajudicial intent.
The 1989 House Report states that the word "deliberated" was
included in the definition "to exclude killings that lack the requisite
extrajudicial intent, such as those caused by a police officer's
authorized use of deadly force." 11 This definition also excluded
"executions carried out under proper judicial authority."38 The House
Report indicates that the "color of law" requirement makes clear that
the TVPA "deals only with officially condoned, tolerated or encouraged
acts of torture or extrajudicial killings."3 9 The 1991 House Report
mirrors this understanding of "deliberated killing. '40
36. Id.
37. H.R. REP. No. 101-55, at 4 (1989). During 1988 hearings before the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Father Robert Drinan who was appearing on behalf
of the American Bar Association, referenced the European Convention on Human
Rights as a model for the TVPA definition of extrajudicial killing. Torture Victim
Protection Act: Hearing and Markup on H.R. 1417 Before the Subcomm. on Human
Rights and Int'l. Orgs. of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 100th Cong. 9-10 (1988)
[hereinafter 1988 House Hearings] (statement of Father Robert Drinan, American
Bar Association). According to Father Drinan, "[a] killing by a soldier in wartime,
for example, or by a police officer in the context of legitimate law enforcement
activity, would constitute extrajudicial killing under authority of their government,
but we would not want those possibly legitimate actions to give rise to private suits
in U.S. courts." To address this concern, he added that "[t]he exclusionary language
found in Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights may be
instructive. .. ." Id. at 7. See also id. at 39-40 (statement of the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York, Committee on International Human Rights) ("Other
international instruments confirm the international consensus that life cannot be
taken by extrajudicial means.") (citations omitted).
38. 1988 House Hearings, supra note 37, at 39. ("In the event there remains
any doubt whether such legally-authorized killings were intended to be excluded,
the definition of 'extrajudicial killing' could be further qualified by adding the term
'unlawful.' Properly understood, this concept should be interpreted as unlawful
under national or international law.") (citation omitted).
39. H.R. REP. NO. 101-55, at 4 (1989).
40. H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 4-5 (1991). The 1991 House Report includes a
small but significant typographical error in its discussion of extrajudicial killing.
The word "exclude" has been transposed with "include" in the following sentence:
"[t]he inclusion of the word 'deliberated' is sufficient also to include killings that
lack the requisite extrajudicial intent. .. ." Id. at 5. This is likely a typographical
error because this language is inconsistent with the 1989 House Report as well as
the Senate report.
2018]
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This interpretation of "deliberated killing" is also supported by
the 1991 Senate Report on the TVPA, which acknowledges that
liability for an extrajudicial killing extends "beyond the person or
persons who actually committed" the act to include "anyone with
higher authority who authorized, tolerated or knowingly ignored those
acts .. -41 The Senate Report references the potential liability of high
ranking officials under the doctrine of command responsibility. Thus,
"a higher official need not have personally performed or ordered the
abuses in order to be held liable. '4 2 Civil liability can extend to the
commander who is aware of killings and does nothing to prevent them
or punish the perpetrator.
There is another provision in the TVPA that offers further
insight into the nature of the claims brought under the statute. When
someone subjects an individual to extrajudicial killing, the TVPA
indicates that person "shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to
the individual's legal representative, or to any person who may be
a claimant in an action for wrongful death. '43 While this provision
addresses the individuals who may be claimants under the statute, it
suggests a relationship between extrajudicial killing and wrongful
death.
In sum, the TVPA's legislative history and text establish that
an extrajudicial killing is a deliberated killing not authorized by a
regularly constituted court that affords all the applicable due process
protections or that is not otherwise justified under international law.
Accordingly, international law must be considered when interpreting
the statute and assessing the legality of a deliberated killing.
II. EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLING UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
The right to life and the corollary right to be free from the
arbitrary deprivation of life constitute the defining human right.
Indeed, the right to life norm has been characterized "as the supreme
human right, since without effective guarantee of this right, all
other rights of the human being would be devoid of meaning. " The
41. S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 9 (1991).
42. Id.
43. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, § 2(a)(2), 106
Stat. 73 (1992).
44. MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS:
ICCPR COMMENTARY 121 (2d ed. 2005); Yoram Dinstein, The Right to Life, Physical
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prohibition of extrajudicial killing is an extension of the right to life
norm and represents a manifestation of the right to be free from the
arbitrary deprivation of life.45 Its status is evidenced in both human
rights law and international humanitarian law, including in an
overwhelming number of multilateral and regional sources. 46
A. Human Rights Law
1. Multilateral Instruments
The right to life was first addressed by the U.N. General
Assembly in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR").47
The experiences of the Second World War influenced the drafting
process, including discussions on the right to life.48 Because the UDHR
was meant to serve as the precursor to a more detailed treaty on
human rights, its provisions were brief. In fact, efforts to provide a
more comprehensive review of the underlying rights were soundly
rejected during the drafting process.49 Accordingly, the UDHR simply
states "[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty, and the security of
Integrity, and Liberty, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 114, 114-15 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981).
45. VERNON VAN DYKE, HUMAN RIGHTS, THE UNITED STATES, AND WORLD
COMMuNITY 9-10 (1969) ("The statement that virtually everyone acknowledges a
right to life means that they acknowledge a right not to be killed-a right to be
safeguarded against arbitrary execution or murder.").
46. The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations of the United States
recognizes the prohibition against extrajudicial killing. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §702 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST.
1986) (stating that it constitutes a violation of international law for "a state to kill
an individual other than as lawful punishment pursuant to conviction in accordance
with due process of law, or as necessary under exigent circumstances, for example
by police officials in line of duty in defense of themselves or of other innocent
persons, or to prevent serious crime.").
47. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 3 (Dec.
10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
48. JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
ORIGINS, DRAFTING, AND INTENT 39-41 (1994).
49. See, e.g., U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Third Committee, Draft International
Declaration of Human Rights: Recapitulation of Amendments to Article 3 of the
Draft Declaration (E/800), U.N. Doc. A/C.3/259/Add.1 (Oct. 13, 1948) (outlining
proposed, but rejected, amendments broadening the scope of human rights).
COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW
person." 50 Every subsequent human rights instrument has been
informed by the UDHR's text and spirit.
51
The right to life and the corollary right to be free from the
arbitrary deprivation of life were formally codified in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"). Article 6(1) provides
that "[elvery human being has the inherent right to life. This right
shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his
life."52 Significantly, the ICCPR indicates the right to life norm is non-
derogable. 53 To be sure, the term "arbitrarily" was criticized by some
delegates during the drafting process as ambiguous and open to
interpretation. 14 Indeed, the term was highly contested during the
drafting process. 55 But according to the travaux prlparatoires, the
term "arbitrarily" was chosen instead of "intentional" because it was
understood "to cover more than cases of intentional killings." 56 In
addition, "it obviated the problem of having to list all cases of
permissible deprivation of life." 57 For this reason, the delegates
50. UDHR, supra note 47, art. 3.
51. Louis Henkin, Introduction, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS:
THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, supra note 44, at 1, 27.
52. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for
signature Dec. 16, 1966, art. 6(1), S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2, at 25 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S.
171, 174 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
53. Id. art. 4(2).
54. U.N. GAOR, 10th Sess., Draft International Covenants on Human
Rights: Annotation 83, U.N. Doc. A/2929, at 82-83 (July 1, 1955); see also Dinstein,
supra note 44, at 116 (discussing the ambiguity of the term "arbitrary"); C.K. Boyle,
The Concept of Arbitrary Deprivation of Life, in THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 5, at 221, 224-26 (exploring previous uses of the
term "arbitrary" in international texts).
55. See generally Laurent Marcoux, Jr., Protection from Arbitrary Arrest and
Detention under International Law, 5 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 345, 364 (1982)
(focusing on the debate that occurred during the drafting process of Article 6 of the
ICCPR as to whether "arbitrary" simply meant unlawful under domestic law, or
whether the term created a higher international standard); Parvez Hassan, The
Word "Arbitrary"As Used In the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: "Illegal"
or "Unjust?," 10 HARV. INT'L L.J. 225, 234-36 (1969) (examining the meaning of the
word "arbitrary" as it is used in the UDHR).
56. NOWAK, supra note 44, at 127. Nowak notes that unintentional killings
can be arbitrary, but that intention is not a requirement for establishing
arbitrariness; see also MARC BOSSUYT, GUIDE TO THE "TRAVAUX PROPARATOIRES"
OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 121-24 (1987)
(stating that in the debate between use of the word "intentionally and "arbitrarily,"
the latter won out because it had been used in the UDHR, and because it meant
both "illegally" and "unjustly").
57. NOWAK, supra note 44, at 127-28.
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rejected proposals to offer a detailed list of exceptions to the right to
life.5" The travaux prgparatoires also reveal that "arbitrarily" meant
without due process of law and included both illegal and unjust
actions. 5
9
The U.N. Human Rights Committee, which was established by
the ICCPR to oversee compliance by States Parties, has issued several
official pronouncements regarding the nature and scope of the right to
life. In 1982, for example, the Human Rights Committee issued its
General Comment No. 6, which addressed the right to life norm in
detail. According to the Committee, this right "is the supreme right
from which no derogation is permitted even in time of public emergency
which threatens the life of the nation .... "60 The Committee indicated
that the deprivation of life by the state is a matter of significant
concern. "Therefore, the law must strictly control and limit the
circumstances in which a person may be deprived of his life by such
authorities. '61 The Committee added "that the right to life has been too
often narrowly interpreted. The expression 'inherent right to life'
cannot properly be understood in a restrictive manner, and the
protection of this right requires that States adopt positive measures. "62
In several cases, the U.N. Human Rights Committee has
addressed the right to life and the obligation to prevent the arbitrary
deprivation of life. In Florentina Olmedo v. Paraguay, the Committee
considered an alleged violation of Article 6 arising out of the
government's use of force against protestors. In this case, agricultural
workers and union members calling for agrarian reform were engaged
58. Boyle, supra note 54, at 228-32.
59. BOSSUYT, supra note 56, at 122-24. During the drafting process,
delegates viewed the term "arbitrarily" as encompassing various meanings,
including "fixed or done capriciously or at pleasure; without adequate determining
principle; depending on the will alone; tyrannical; despotic; without cause upon law;
not governed by any fixed rule or standard." Id. at 123 (citing various Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights session reports, including UN Doc.
A/C.3/SR.812, para. 15; UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.813, para. 43; UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.61,
para. 1).
60. Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 6: Article 6 (The Right to Life),
1, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/l/Rev.1, at 6 (1982). The Human Rights Committee is in
the process of drafting a new General Comment that would provide greater details
regarding the right to life norm and its attendant obligations on states.
61. Id. % 3.
62. Id. 5.
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in a public protest against the government.6 3 Their peaceful protest
sought to block a local highway when they were confronted by security
forces.6 4 The demonstrators found themselves facing a large group
of police and military personnel who ordered the demonstrators to
unblock the road. While negotiations between the demonstrators and
the government were ongoing, the police began using force to clear the
road. 'The police attack was immediate and violent, and involved
the use of tear gas, firearms and water cannons."6 The police fired
indiscriminately into the crowd and killed several protestors.
Individuals who were fleeing or had already surrendered were also
shot. The decedent, Eulalio Blanco Dominguez, was beaten and shot at
close range by police.
6 6
In assessing the government's use of force, the Human Rights
Committee acknowledged that states have an obligation "to prevent
arbitrary killing by their own security forces."6 1 In this case, Paraguay
had an "obligation to protect the life of the demonstrators." 6' Given
the grave circumstances surrounding Blanco Dominguez's death,
Paraguay also had an obligation to conduct a thorough investigation.
For these reasons, the Committee determined Paraguay had violated
the right to life norm.
6 9
2. Regional Instruments
The right to life is also addressed in several regional human
rights agreements.7 ° The European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("European Convention")
is of particular significance because it was cited in the TVPA's
legislative history. 71 The European Convention provides that
"[e]veryone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be
63. Florentina Olmedo v. Paraguay, Commc'n No. 1828/2008, 2.1 (Hum.
Rts. Comm. 2012).
64. Id. 2.4.
65. Id. 2.5.
66. Id. 2.7.
67. Id. 7.3.
68. Id. 7.5.
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights art. 4, June 27,
1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/rev.5 (stating "[e]very human being shall be
entitled to respect for his life and the integrity of his person. No one may be
arbitrarily deprived of this right.").
71. S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 6 (1991).
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deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of
a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is
provided by law."7 2 The European Convention then adds a significant
qualification to this norm.
Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in
contravention of this article when it results from the
use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:
(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; (b)
in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent escape of
a person lawfully detained; (c) in action lawfully taken
for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection. 73
Because of its impact on the right to life, this qualification is
interpreted narrowly.
In Solomou and Others v. Turkey, the European Court of
Human Rights considered whether Turkey had violated the prohibition
against the arbitrary deprivation of life when an unarmed civilian
was shot and killed during a public demonstration. 7 While some
demonstrators were armed with sticks and iron bars and some were
throwing stones at Turkish forces, the decedent was not. He was
unarmed and not attacking or threatening anyone. The Court
concluded there had been a violation of the right to life norm because
"a potential illegal or violent action from a group of persons cannot, as
such, justify the immediate shooting and killing of one or more other
individuals who are not themselves posing a threat." 75 While the
European Convention authorized the use of lethal force for the purpose
of quelling a riot or insurrection, the Court indicated that the use of
force must be "absolutely necessary" and that "potential or illegal
violent action from a group of persons cannot, as such, justify the
immediate shooting and killing of one or more other individuals who
are not themselves posing a threat. '76
72. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms art. 2(1), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter
European Convention].
73. Id. art. 2(2).
74. Solomou and Others v. Turkey, App. No. 36832/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008).
75. Id. 7I 78.
76. Id. See also Gtiluq v. Turkey, App. No. 54/1997/838/1044, Eur. Ct. H.R. 3,
35-39 (1998) (finding a breach of art. 2 when an individual was killed by security
forces during a demonstration).
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Both the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man ("American Declaration") and the American Convention on
Human Rights ("American Convention") recognize the right to life and
its ensuing obligations. 77 Adopted in 1948 by the International
Conference of American States, the American Declaration provides
that "[e]very human being has the right to life, liberty and security of
his person." 78 In 1969, the Inter-American Conference on Human
Rights completed its work on the American Convention, and the right
to life norm was an integral feature of the treaty.79 According to Article
4(1), "[elvery person has the right to have his life respected. This right
shall be protected by law and, in general, from the moment of
conception. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life."
°8
In Neira Alegria v. Peru, the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights examined the applicability of the right to life norm in a case
involving the government's use of force to quell a prison uprising.81 In
that case, the Peruvian military used overwhelming force to crush
a prison riot. To suppress the uprising, the military destroyed the
building that was occupied by the inmates. Over 100 inmates were
killed. The Court indicated this case concerned the right of the state to
use force "to maintain law and order" when doing so "implies depriving
people of their lives. 8 2 Although the Court acknowledged the inmates
were "highly dangerous and, in fact armed," it did not find these facts
"constitute[d] sufficient reasons to justify the amount of force
used ....-"8 3 The Court then quoted from its prior decisions regarding
a government's obligation to refrain from the excessive use of force.
77. See American Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature Nov.
22, 1969, art. 4(1), O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143, 145 (entered into force
July 18, 1978); American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res.
XXX, 9th Int'l Conference of American States art. 1, O.A.S. Official Record,
OEA/Ser.L/V./II.23, doc.21 rev.6 (1948), reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining
to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1 at
17 (1992).
78. American Declaration, supra note 77, at art. I.
79. J. Colon-Collazo, A Legislative History of the Right to Life in the Inter-
American Legal System, in THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 33, 39 (B.G.
Ramcharan ed., 1985).
80. American Convention, supra note 77, at art. 4(1).
81. Neira Alegria v. Peru, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 20, T 74-76 (Jan. 19, 1995).
82. Id. 74.
83. Id.
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Without question, the State has the right and duty to
guarantee its security. It is also indisputable that all
societies suffer some deficiencies in their legal orders.
However, regardless of the seriousness of certain
actions and the culpability of the perpetrators of
certain crimes, the power of the State is not unlimited,
nor may the State resort to any means to attain its
ends. The State is subject to law and morality.
Disrespect for human dignity cannot serve as the basis
for any State action.8 4
Accordingly, the Court concluded the use of lethal force violated the
right to life norm.8 5
Along with the Inter-American Court, the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights has also addressed the scope of the right
to life norm. 6 Its work highlights the breadth of the norm, including
its applicability in times of peace or armed conflict. In its 2002 Report
on Terrorism and Human Rights, for example, the Inter-American
Commission examined the right to life under both human rights
law and humanitarian law."7 While the Inter-American Commission
acknowledged that "the contours of the right to life may change in
the context of an armed conflict," the prohibition on the "arbitrary
deprivation of life remains absolute. '8 Accordingly, the right to life
may not be suspended. 9 In addition, the Commission indicated that
the use of lethal force must be necessary and proportionate "where
strictly unavoidable to protect against imminent threat of death. . .."90
Otherwise, the use of force would constitute "an arbitrary deprivation
of life or a summary execution. .".."91 The Commission affirmed these
84. Id. 75 (quoting Velsquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, Merits, Reparations,
and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, 154 (July 29, 1988);
Godinez-Cruz v. Honduras, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 5, 162 (Jan. 20, 1989)).
85. Id. 76.
86. See, e.g., Arturo Ribon Avila v. Colombia, Case 11.142, Inter-Am.
Comm'n H.R., Report No. 26/97, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, doc. 6 rev. 135 (1997) (noting
that Article 4 of the American Convention prohibits extrajudicial killings even in
situations of armed conflict).
87. Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R.,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.116, doc. 5 rev. 1 corr. (2002).
88. Id. 86.
89. Id.
90. Id. 87.
91. Id. 88.
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principles in its 2009 Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights.9 2
It noted that states violate their obligation under the right to life
norm when their security forces "use lethal force that is beyond
internationally recognized boundaries."9 3 Accordingly, the use of force
must be necessary and proportionate. 94 States also violate their
obligation when they fail to adopt effective measures "against the
actions of private parties who threaten or violate the right to life of
persons subject to its jurisdiction. . .. .95
3. U.N. Statements
Along with its codification in multilateral and regional
instruments and its recognition by their attendant human rights
bodies, the prohibition against extrajudicial killing has been
recognized in numerous statements by U.N. bodies.
In 1989, for example, the U.N. Economic and Social Council
adopted the well-regarded Principles on the Effective Prevention and
Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions
("1989 U.N. Principles") to reinforce the substantive obligation of
states to protect life and to prevent extrajudicial killings. 9 The
Principles require states to prohibit "all extra-legal, arbitrary and
summary executions" and to "ensure that any such executions are
recognized as offences under their criminal laws, and are punishable
by appropriate penalties which take into account the seriousness of
such offences." 97 To prevent extrajudicial killings, governments must
"ensure strict control, including a clear chain of command over all
officials responsible for apprehension, arrest, detention, custody, and
imprisonment, as well as those officials authorized by law to use force
and firearms."98 In addition, governments must "prohibit orders from
superior officers or public authorities authorizing or inciting other
persons to carry out any such extra-legal, arbitrary or summary
92. Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R.,
OEA/Ser.lUV/II, doc. 57 (2009).
93. Id. 107.
94. Id. 114.
95. Id. 107.
96. Economic and Social Council Res. 1989/65, Principles on the Effective
Prevention and Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions
(May 24, 1989).
97. Id. 11.
98. Id. 2.
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executions." 99 Significantly, "[eixceptional circumstances including a
state of war or threat of war, internal political instability or any other
public emergency may not be invoked as a justification of... [extra-
legal] executions. 1 0
The United Nations adopted the Manual on the Effective
Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary
Executions ("1991 U.N. Manual") to complement the 1989 Principles. 10 1
The Manual defined executions to include: "(a) political assassinations;
(b) deaths resulting from torture or ill-treatment in prison or detention;
(c) death resulting from enforced 'disappearances'; (d) deaths resulting
from the excessive use of force by law-enforcement personnel;
(e) executions without due process; and (f) acts of genocide." 102 The
Manual then offered a set of model protocols for how states should
address claims of extrajudicial killings. These protocols addressed the
manner in which states should conduct investigations, disinterment,
and autopsies in cases of extrajudicial killings. While not binding,
these protocols were meant to assist states in complying with the 1989
U.N. Principles.
In 2016, the United Nations adopted the Minnesota Protocol
on the Investigation of Potentially Unlawful Death ("Minnesota
Protocol"), which revised the 1991 U.N. Manual. 103 In contrast to the
U.N. Manual, the Minnesota Protocol offers a much broader approach
to the issue of extrajudicial killings. It applies to all potentially
unlawful deaths, which include situations where: (1) "[t]he death may
have been caused by acts or omissions of the State, its organs or agents,
or may otherwise be attributable to the State, in violation of its duty
to respect the right to life;" (2) "[the death occurred when a person was
detained by, or was in the custody of, the State, its organs, or agents;"
or (3) "[t]he death occurred where the State may have failed to meet its
obligations to protect life.' 0 4 The Minnesota Protocol provides several
examples of what constitutes an unlawful death.
99. Id. 3.
100. Id. 1.
101. U.N. Ctr. for Soc. Dev. and Humanitarian Affairs, Manual on the
Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary
Executions, U.N. Doc. E/ST/CSDHA/12, U.N. Sales No. E.91.IV.1 (1991).
102. Id. at 3.
103. Office of the U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights, Minnesota Protocol
on the Investigation of Potentially Unlawful Death (2016), U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/17/4
(May 24, 2017) [hereinafter Minnesota Protocol].
104. Id. at 1.
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This includes, for example, all deaths possibly caused
by law enforcement personnel or other agents of the
state; deaths caused by paramilitary groups, militias
or "death squads" suspected of acting under the
direction or with the permission or acquiescence of
the State; and deaths caused by private military or
security forces exercising State functions. 1 5
The Minnesota Protocol makes clear that states have an affirmative
obligation to protect human life. This includes "any situation where
a state fails to exercise due diligence to protect an individual or
individuals from foreseeable external threats or violence by non-State
actors. "106
Another relevant international instrument is the Basic
Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement
Officials ("1990 U.N. Basic Principles"), which was adopted by the
United Nations in 1990. 107 This document recognizes that law
enforcement officials must occasionally use force to ensure public
safety. When the use of force is unavoidable, law enforcement officials
must adhere to specific standards of conduct. They must "[e]xercise
restraint in such use and act in proportion to the seriousness of the
offence and the legitimate objective to be achieved ... "108 They must
also "minimize damage and injury, and respect and preserve human
life . . "109 The U.N. Basic Principles contain extensive requirements
regarding training on the use of force, protocols to be followed when
firearms are used, and the use of force to disperse assemblies. 110 These
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Eighth U.N. Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the
Treatment of Offenders, Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law
Enforcement Officials, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 144/28/Rev.1 (Sept. 7, 1990).
108. Id. I 5(a).
109. Id. 5(b).
110. See generally UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME,
RESOURCE BOOK ON THE USE OF FORCE AND FIREARMS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT
(2017) (examining law enforcement sources relevant to the use of force and
suggesting how to promote accountability in the use of force and firearms by law
enforcement).
[50:1
A Primer on Extrajudicial Killing
principles are relevant in assessing whether a state's use of force that
leads to loss of life is lawful or constitutes an extrajudicial killing.11 '
The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or
Arbitrary Executions ("U.N. Special Rapporteur") was established by
the U.N. Commission on Human Rights "to examine situations of
extrajudicial, summary or [arbitrary executions] in all circumstances
and for whatever reason." 112 The original mandate addressed
"summary and arbitrary executions." '13 In 1992, the Commission
on Human Rights broadened the mandate to include "extrajudicial
executions."114 Significantly, the terms "extrajudicial, summary, or
arbitrary executions" are not meant to limit the Special Rapporteur's
work. 115 Instead, they represent the historical evolution of the
mandate, which now requires the Special Rapporteur to address "a
range of contexts in which killings have taken place in circumstances
which contravene international law... "116 However, the Special
Rapporteur has indicated the "central concern of the mandate remains
'executions:' the use of lethal force by one human being against
another.""
17
Since its creation, the U.N. Special Rapporteur has issued
numerous statements on the prohibition against extrajudicial
killing.118 The Special Rapporteur has noted, for example, that states
111. Id. at 1-11. See also G.A. Res. 34/169, Code of Conduct for Law
Enforcement Officials, at 185 (1979) (exploring international law sources and the
general responsibility of law enforcement authorities relevant to the use of force").
112. Human Rights Council Res. 26/12, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/26/12, 7(a)
(July 11, 2014).
113. Comm'n on Human Rights, Rep. on the Thirty-Eighth Session,
Summary or Arbitrary Executions, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1982/30, at 2 (Mar. 11, 1982).
114. Comm'n on Human Rights, Rep. on the Forty-Eighth Session,
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1992/84, at
169-71 (1992).
115. Human Rights Council, Civil and Political Rights, Including the
Questions of Disappearances and Summary Executions, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/7,
6 (Dec. 22, 2004) ("The terms of reference of this mandate are not best understood
through efforts to define individually the terms 'extrajudicial', 'summary' or
'arbitrary', or to seek to categorize any given incident accordingly.").
116. Id.
117. U.N. Secretary-General, Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary
Executions, 17, U.N. Doc. A/71/372 (Sept. 2, 2016).
118. See, e.g., Christof Heyns (Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial,
Summary, or Arbitrary Executions), Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on
Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/26/36 (Apr. 1,
2014) [hereinafter 2014 Special Rapporteur Report] (reporting on and condemning
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often have a monopoly on the use of force and that such force can easily
be abused.119 The Special Rapporteur has also raised concerns about
deaths caused by the excessive use of force by law enforcement
personnel, deaths committed by security forces, and violations of the
right to life during armed conflict.120 To avoid such abuses, the Special
Rapporteur has stated that "those using force need to function within
domestic legal frameworks on the use of force that comply with
international human rights law and, where applicable, international
humanitarian law." 121 Significantly, the Special Rapporteur has
indicated that deliberate intent is not required for a killing to be
deemed arbitrary. "Quite the opposite: killings in circumstances of
unnecessary or disproportionate excessive use of force by the police are
likely to be arbitrary, even though the police may not have killed
intentionally."
122
When a life has been taken, the U.N. Special Rapporteur has
indicated that states must show their actions complied with
the use of extrajudicial killing); U.N. Secretary-General, Extrajudicial, Summary
or Arbitrary Executions, 17, U.N. Doc. A/68/382 (Sept. 13, 2013); Philip Alston
(Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions), Rep. of
the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/14/24 (May 20, 2010) (reporting on and condemning the use of
extrajudicial killing).
119. Christof Heyns (Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or
Arbitrary Executions), Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary
or Arbitrary Executions on the Right to Life and the Use of Force by Private Security
Providers in Law Enforcement Contexts, 51, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/32/39 (May 6, 2016)
[hereinafter 2016 Special Rapporteur Report]; see also Christof Heyns (Special
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions), Rep. of the
Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, 43, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/17/28 (May 23, 2011) ("The primary purpose of the recognition of the
right to life is to protect people from being killed by the State, the entity that claims
and, to a large extent, exercises monopoly on the use of force.").
120. United Nations, Fact Sheet No. 11 (Rev. 1), Extrajudicial, Summary or
Arbitrary Executions, https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheetl
lrev.len.pdf [https://perma.cc/57DF-G57X] [hereinafter United Nations Fact Sheet
No. 11].
121. 2016 Special Rapporteur Report, supra note 119, 51.
122. U.N. General Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur on
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions on a Gender-Sensitive Approach
to Arbitrary Killings, at 11 34, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/35/23 (June 6, 2017); see also U.N.
General Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council
on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions: Saving Lives is Not a Crime,
at 15, U.N. Doc. A/73/314 (Aug. 7, 2018).
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international standards. 123 If any of the relevant standards are not
met, the deprivation of life will be deemed arbitrary and a violation of
international law. 124 Accordingly, there must be sufficient legal basis
for the use of lethal force. 125 Lethal force may only be used for
legitimate objectives, which are limited to saving a person from serious
injury or death. 126 The use of lethal force must be necessary, which
"means that force should be the last resort... and if it is needed,
graduated force (the minimum required) should be applied. ' '127 It must
be proportionate to the interest that is being protected, which means
"[t]he interest harmed by the use of force is measured against the
interest protected .... " 121 Special provisions must be made in cases of
public demonstrations or when individuals are detained by the state. 129
Laws regulating the use of force must be published and accessible. 130
The Special Rapporteur has added that states must take all possible
measures to avoid situations where loss of life may occur. "A failure to
take proper precautions in such a context constitutes a violation of the
right to life." 131
Human rights law addresses extrajudicial killing in other
ways. The prohibitions against crimes against humanity and genocide
also address extrajudicial killing. Murder was first recognized as a
crime against humanity in the Charter of the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg. 132 Killing was first recognized as a form of
123. 2014 Special Rapporteur Report, supra note 118, 55. The Special
Rapporteur identified two "soft law" sources that describe the conditions for use of
force by law enforcement officers: Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials
and the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement
Officials.
124. Id.
125. Id. 56.
126. Id. 58.
127. Id. 59.
128. Id. 65.
129. Id. 75, 76. The U.N. Human Rights Council has indicated that "states
have the responsibility, including in the context of peaceful protests, to promote
and protect human rights and to prevent human rights violations, including
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions,. " Human Rights Council Res.
25/38, The Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in the Context of Peaceful
Protests, 2, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/25/38 (Apr. 11, 2014).
130. 2014 Special Rapporteur Report, supra note 118, 57.
131. Id. 64.
132. Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Aug. 8,
1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
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genocide in the Genocide Convention. 133 These norms have since been
codified in the statutes of various ad hoc international criminal
tribunals as well as the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court. Genocide includes killing members of an enumerated group
with the intent to destroy that group, in whole or in part.13 4 Murder
constitutes a crime against humanity when it is committed as
part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a
civilian population. 135 The Elements of Crimes document adopted
under the Rome Statute indicates that murder or killing has occurred
when "[tihe perpetrator killed one or more persons." 136 The term
"killed" is used interchangeably with the term "caused death."137 This
language is repeated with respect to both genocide and crimes against
humanity.
B. International Humanitarian Law
The prohibition against extrajudicial killing is not limited to
human rights law. It is also addressed in international humanitarian
law, although there are nuances to its application in times of armed
conflict.13 On the one hand, the killing of combatants in hostilities
is lawful when such acts comply with the applicable principles of
necessity, distinction, proportionality, and precaution. 13 9 On the other
133. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Dec. 9, 1989, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
134. Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 6(a).
135. Id. art. 7(a)-(b).
136. International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes, at 5, U.N. Doc. ICC-
PIDS-LT-03-002/11lEng (2011) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter ICC Elements of
Crimes].
137. Id. n.7.
138. See generally THE GREY ZONE: CIVILIAN PROTECTION BETWEEN HUMAN
RIGHTS AND THE LAWS OF WAR (Mark Lattimer & Philippe Sands eds., 2018)
(examining the shortcomings in human rights and humanitarian law with respect
to civilian protection in modern armed conflicts); ALEXANDER B. DOWNES,
TARGETING CILIANS IN WAR (2012) (exploring the norms surrounding use of force
on non-combatants as well as when and why those norms are broken).
139. See generally INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEP'T, U.S. ARMY
JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN.'S LEGAL CTR. & SCH., LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT DESKBOOK
(David Lee ed., 5th ed. 2015) (discussing use of force in conjunction with these
principles); Robert Chesney, Who May Be Killed? Anwar al-Awlaki as a Case Study
in the International Legal Regulation of Lethal Force, 13 Y.B. INT'L HUMANITARIAN.
L. 1, 5 (2010) (considering the function of these principles in international
humanitarian law and human rights law); Ryan Goodman, The Power to Kill or
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hand, killings that do not comply with these principles constitute
extrajudicial killings. Non-combatants, including civilians, are thus
protected by international humanitarian law. In sum, "human rights
and IHL [international humanitarian law] regulate the resort by
States to lethal force based on the same fundamental principles. 1 40
Within international humanitarian law, the 1949 Geneva
Conventions merit special consideration because of their significance
in the drafting of the TVPA. Common Article 3, which was specifically
referenced in the TVPA's legislative history, provides that "violence to
life and person, in particular murder of all kinds" is "prohibited at
any time and in any place whatsoever." 141 Commentary provided
by the International Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC") on the
Geneva Conventions does not offer an explicit definition regarding the
elements for murder as set forth in Common Article 3. 142 But, it
emphasizes the prohibition against murder is absolute and there are
no loopholes, exceptions, or "attenuating circumstances" to justify such
acts.1 43 While Common Article 3 is limited to non-international armed
conflicts, a similar prohibition applies to international armed conflicts.
The Geneva Conventions designate willful killing as a grave breach,
which subjects the perpetrator to criminal liability and imposes an
obligation on States Parties to prosecute.1 44 The prohibitions against
murder and willful killing were affirmed in the 1977 Additional
Protocols to the Geneva Conventions. 145 More recently, these
Capture Enemy Combatants, 24 EUR. J. INT'L L. 819 (2013) (discussing restraints
on use of force, including necessity and proportionality).
140. NILS MELZER, TARGETED KILLING IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 176 (2008).
See also THEODOR MERON, THE HUMANIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 45-55,
473-526 (2006) (discussing the similarities and interaction between human rights
and international humanitarian law); Alexander Orakhelashvili, The Interaction
between Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: Fragmentation, Conflict,
Parallelism, or Convergence, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 161, 161-82 (2008) (exploring the
extent and consequences of convergence of human rights law and international
humanitarian law).
141. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 24, art. 3(1).
142. OSCAR M. UHLER ET AL., COMMENTARY IV GENEVA CONVENTION
RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 38 (Jean S.
Pictet ed., Ronald Griffin & C.W. Dumbleton trans., 1958).
143. Id.
144. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 24, art. 129-30.
145. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 75, June
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 37 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978) [hereinafter Additional
Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
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prohibitions were codified as war crimes in the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court ("Rome Statute"). 146 The practice
of international criminal tribunals reveals there is no meaningful
distinction between murder and willful killing.
147
The prohibition against extrajudicial killing in times of
armed conflict is not limited to treaty law; it has attained the
status of customary international law.148 This status is reflected in a
multitude of established norms. For example, it is well-established
that combatants must distinguish between civilian and military
objectives.1 49 Combatants may not direct attacks against civilians.
150
And, they must verify that targets are, in fact, military targets. 151
Moreover, international humanitarian law prohibits indiscriminate
attacks, 52 which are defined as attacks that are not directed or cannot
be directed at a specific military objective." 153
In sum, the right to life and the corresponding right to be free
from the arbitrary deprivation of life provide the foundation for the
prohibition against extrajudicial killing. This prohibition regulates
the use of lethal force by law enforcement, security forces, and
military personnel. It applies in times of peace, as well as in times of
armed conflict. While such killings are often captioned in different
ways-murder, arbitrary deprivation of life, unlawful killing,
summary execution, arbitrary execution, extrajudicial killing-they
maintain a common core. The International Commission of Jurists has
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, art. 4,
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 612 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978) [hereinafter
Additional Protocol II]. See also 1 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-
BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: RULES 311 (2005) (noting
the prohibition of willful killing and murder by the Geneva Conventions and 1977
Additional Protocols).
146. Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 8.
147. KNUT DORMANN ET AL., ELEMENTS OF WAR CRIMES UNDER THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: SOURCES AND COMMENTARY
39-40 (2003).
148. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 145, at 37.
149. Id. at 25.
150. Id. at 3.
151. Id. at 55.
152. Id. at 37.
153. Id. at 40.
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recognized that the right to life norm covers "a broad spectrum of
phenomena and practices. 15 4
Thus, for example, the following are considered to
constitute a violation of this right: the imposition
of the death penalty in conditions prohibited by
international law; the deaths of persons deprived of
their liberty as a result of abandonment, excessive
use of force and/or detention conditions that endanger
the personal integrity of detainees; deaths due to
excessive use and/or unlawful use of lethal force
by law enforcement officials; deaths resulting from
attacks by State security forces, paramilitary groups,
death squads or other groups of individuals acting
with the authorization, tolerance or acquiescence of
the state; and the deliberate and intentional killings of
civilians, combatants hors de combat and 'protected
persons' under international humanitarian law . 1 5 5
Scholars have also recognized the broad range of conduct that
implicates the right to life norm. 5 6 As noted by Sarah Knuckey,
[i]nternational law regulates all killings committed
during peacetime or armed conflict, and killings of
many different forms are prohibited by a variety of
distinctly named international violations and crimes.
The different constructions often capture a key
characteristic of a particular form of unlawful killing.
Terminology and the elements of different unlawful
killing offences often overlap, however, and clearly
separating legal offences, as well as conceptually
154. INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS, ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCE AND
EXTRAJUDICIAL EXECUTION: INVESTIGATION AND SANCTION, PRACTITIONERS
GUIDE NO. 9, at 63 (2015).
155. Id.
156. See generally RODLEY & POLLARD, supra note 1, at 246-51 (discussing
the meaning of the "the right to life" norm in the international sphere); Interview,
The Challenges of Responding to Extrajudicial Executions: Interview with Philip
Alston, 2 J. HUM. RTS. PR. 355, 355-73 (2010) (addressing the complexities of extra-
judicial killings); Edy Kaufman & Patricia Weiss Fagan, Extrajudicial Executions:
An Insight into the Global Dimensions of a Human Rights Violation, 9 HUM. RTS.
Q. 81, 81 (1981) (discussing regional practices of different countries that can be
construed as violating the obligation to protect the right to life). Cf. MELZER, supra
note 140, at 3-8.
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separating forms of killings, can in practice be
challenging. The content of offences and names of
killings have also shifted over time, and there
have been explicit attempts to both harmonize and
distinguish.15 7
This overview provides a foundation for a more detailed assessment of
the prohibition against extrajudicial killing.
III. DEFINING EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLING
International practice reveals that the prohibition against
extrajudicial killing has two components: a substantive component and
a procedural component. 158 The substantive component places limits on
the use of force by states to prevent the arbitrary deprivation of life.
159
The procedural component requires states to conduct investigations
and pursue accountability when there is reason to believe an arbitrary
deprivation of life has occurred. An extrajudicial killing can thus
implicate both components.
6 0
A. The Substantive Component
The prohibition against extrajudicial killing encompasses a
variety of situations involving the arbitrary deprivation of life. While
its application will vary based upon particular circumstances, there
is a common core to the prohibition. 161 An extrajudicial killing occurs
when:
1. a public official or other person acting at the instigation of
or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other
person acting in an official capacity;
2. whose acts were intentional or negligent;
157. Sarah Knuckey, Murder in Common Article 3, in THE 1949 GENEVA
CONVENTIONS: A COMMENTARY 449, 466 (Andrew Clapham et al., eds. 2015).
158. See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY 134 (2015) [hereinafter SCHABAS II]; SARAH JOSEPH &
MELISSA CASTAN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS: CASES, MATERIALS AND COMMENTARY 167, 176 (3d ed., 2013); LAURENCE
BURGORGUE-LARSEN & AMAYA UBEDA DE TORRES, THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS: CASE LAW AND COMMENTARY 342-43 (Rosalind Greenstein trans.,
2011).
159. 2014 Special Rapporteur Report, supra note 118, 46.
160. Id.
161. See PARK, supra note 6, at 22.
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3. and resulted in one or more deaths;
4. and who knew or should have known that death may result
from their acts;
5. and who failed to comply with any relevant standards
regarding the use of force, including the principles of
necessity, distinction, proportionality, and precaution;
6. and whose acts were not authorized by legal process or
complied with the rule of law.
These elements constitute the substantive component of the
prohibition against extrajudicial killing. Each element must be
established for a claim of extrajudicial killing.
Extrajudicial killing requires some form of state action.'62 This
requirement is consistent with most international norms. However, it
is well-established that the state action requirement can be implicated
when non-state actors operate with the consent or acquiescence of
public officials or other persons acting in an official capacity. 163 In these
cases, states can be held responsible for violations committed by non-
state actors. 1' Claims of command or superior responsibility are
distinct from this element because they constitute a theory of liability
rather than a separate offense.165
The actus reus for extrajudicial killing involves acts or
omissions that result in death. While most cases of extrajudicial killing
will involve affirmative acts by perpetrators, there may be occasions
when the failure to act also results in death. And, of course, there must
162. See United Nations Fact Sheet No. 11, supra note 120, at 1.
163. See generally NON-STATE ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 164 (Math
Noortmann et al. eds., 2015) (explaining that a sufficiently strong link to a non-
state actor can justify the attribution of non-state conduct to the state); NON-STATE
ACTORS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 454 (Andrea Bianchi ed., 2009) (noting that the
state actor requirement can be fulfilled when the state acquiesces to human rights
violations by private actors).
164. See, e.g., Comm'n on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur
on civil and political rights, including the questions of disappearances and
summary executions, 20, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/7 (Dec. 22, 2004) (holding a
number of states accountable for death threats carried out by paramilitary groups
tolerated by the state).
165. Darryl Robinson, How Command Responsibility Got So Complicated: A
Culpability Contradiction, Its Obfuscation, and a Simple Solution, 13 MELBOURNE
J. INT'L L. 1, 32-36 (2012).
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be a causal link between the act or omission and the death. 166 The mens
rea for extrajudicial killing includes several elements. The acts or
omissions that give rise to an extrajudicial killing must be deliberate.
To qualify as deliberate, an act or omission must involve intentional or
negligent behavior. 167 The perpetrators must also know or have reason
to know that death may result from their acts or omissions.
The principles of necessity, distinction, proportionality, and
precaution are essential for assessing the legitimacy of state action
in cases of extrajudicial killing.168 They provide a set of independent
standards for determining whether the use of lethal force is lawful
or a violation of international law. These principles are particularly
significant because they confirm that not all deaths are unlawful. On
some occasions, the use of lethal force may be justified. For example,
the U.N. Special Rapporteur has indicated that "[tihe intentional
lethal use of force by law enforcement officials and others is
permissible in very exceptional cases only, namely when its use against
a perpetrator is strictly unavoidable in order to protect human life from
unlawful attack (making it proportionate) and all other means are
insufficient to achieve that objective (making it necessary)." 169 The
166. See generally Vladislava Stoyanova, Causation Between State Omission
and Harm Within the Framework of Positive Obligations Under the European
Convention on Human Rights, 18 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 309 (2018).
167. See generally PARK, supra note 6, at 22, 34 (explaining that even where
the term "negligence" is not explicitly used, deprivations of the right to life include
negligent as well as intentional deprivations by the state).
168. See generally GENEVA ACADEMY, USE OF FORCE IN LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND THE RIGHT TO LIFE: THE ROLE OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL 6-10 (2016)
(noting that necessity, proportionality, and precaution are the three main
principles governing the use of force); Juana Maria Ibanez Rivas, Use of Force:
Requirements, Limitations and Pending Challenges from the Perspective of the
Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in THE INTER-
AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: THEORY AND PRACTICE, PRESENT AND
FUTURE 193, 206-07 (Yves Haeck et al. eds., 2015) (explaining that any authorized
use of force must be in accordance with principles of legality, legitimacy, necessity,
and proportionality); SCHABAS II, supra note 158, at 156-58 (noting that a court
must not only decide whether the use of force was for a legitimate aim but also
whether the measures used were proportionate); MELZER, supra note 140, at
100-02 (discussing sufficient legal basis, necessity, proportionality, and precaution
as elements to determine "arbitrariness" of deprivation of life).
169. U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions on the Right to Life and the Use of
Force by Private Security Providers in Law Enforcement Contexts, 51, U.N. Doc.
AIHRC/32/39 (Sept. 6, 2016) ("The evaluation of necessity is a factual cause and
effect assessment of whether the use of force is actually required to achieve the
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U.N. Special Rapporteur has also noted that the principle of precaution
is an additional consideration for assessing whether the lethal use
of force by state officials is legitimate or whether it constitutes an
extrajudicial killing. According to the Special Rapporteur's 2016
Report, "[it is not enough for a State or its agents to say that they had
no choice but to use force if the escalation of that situation could
reasonably have been avoided through precautionary measures." 170
Thus, the principles of necessity, distinction, proportionality, and
precaution offer essential guides for regulating the use of lethal force
and for determining when an extrajudicial killing has occurred.
Finally, an extrajudicial killing is an act that has not been
authorized by legal process or complies with the rule of law. This
generally means approval by a regularly constituted court that affords
the full panoply of due process protections. It is not always sufficient
for an extrajudicial killing to be authorized by a legislative or executive
act. Judicial review offers a check against excessive government
authority by providing individualized assessment. 171 In sum, this is
a fact-intensive and rule-based inquiry to determine whether the
deprivation of life is arbitrary.
Various human rights courts and other human rights bodies
have examined the substantive component of the prohibition against
extrajudicial killing and have applied it in specific cases.
In Umetaliev v. Kyrgyzstan, for example, the U.N. Human
Rights Committee considered a claim of extrajudicial killing in relation
to Article 6 of the ICCPR.17 2 In this case, a government militia opened
desired outcome (qualitative necessity) and, if so, how much force is unavoidable
for that purpose (quantitative necessity). The requirement of necessity raises the
question of whether the threat could not be averted by resort to less harmful means
and thus requires a graduated approach to the use of force.").
170. Id. 55. See also INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS, supra note 154, at 72 (listing
the basic principles that govern the use of force by state actors).
171. See generally SCHABAS II, supra note 158, at 126-27 (explaining that
the positive obligation on States to protect life includes a duty to have appropriate
legal and administrative frameworks in place to deter the commissions of offences
against persons); NOWAK, supra note 44, at 122-24 (discussing the legislative
bodies' specific obligation to protect the right to life, under Art.6(1) of the CCPR);
see also Hugo van Alphen v. The Netherlands, Commc'n No. 305/1988, Hum. Rts.
Comm., $ 5.8 (July 23, 1990) (noting that "arbitrariness" of deprivation "is not to be
equated with 'against the law', but must be interpreted more broadly to include
elements of inappropriateness, injustice and lack of predictability.").
172. Umetaliev v. Kyrgyzstan, Commc'n No. 1275/2004, Hum. Rts. Comm.
(Oct. 30, 2008).
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fire with automatic weapons on demonstrators in an attempt to
disperse a crowd of people engaged in a political demonstration.
Eldiyar Umetaliev was shot and killed, and several other
demonstrators were wounded. The Human Rights Committee
acknowledged that the use of firearms by public authorities could have
serious consequences for the right to life. 7 3 "Therefore, the law must
strictly control and limit the circumstances in which a person may be
deprived of his life by such authorities." 7 4 The Committee further
acknowledged that Kyrgyzstan had not provided "any arguments that
it took effective and feasible measures, in compliance with its
obligation to protect the right to life under Article 6, paragraph 1, to
prevent and to refrain from the arbitrary deprivation of life." 1
7 5
Accordingly, the Committee determined that Kyrgyzstan had violated
Article 6.
The European Court of Human Rights has also developed an
extensive jurisprudence on extrajudicial killing. In Gul v. Turkey, for
example, a special operations unit of a police force that was conducting
a search for suspected terrorists received faulty intelligence that led
them to the house of Mehmet Gul.'7 6 When Gul approached the front
door in response to light knocking by the police, several officers opened
fired and shot repeatedly through the closed door, killing him.
Approximately 50-55 shots were fired at the door, and Gul was hit
multiple times.177 Gul had posed no threat to the police and, in fact, he
was innocent of any terrorist activity. In considering whether the use
of force violated Article 2 of the European Convention, the Court noted
"[t]he text of Article 2, read as a whole, demonstrates that it covers not
only intentional killing but also the situations where it is permitted to
'use force' which may result, as an unintended outcome, in the
deprivation of life." 17 8 The Court indicated that the use of force must be
no more than absolutely necessary and must be strictly proportionate
to the achievement of the permitted aims in Article 2.119 Examining the
facts of the case, the Court stated it did not need "to determine whether
the police officers had formulated the intention of killing or acted with
173. Id. 9.4.
174. Id. 9.5.
175. Id. 9.4.
176. Gul v. Turkey, App. No. 22676/93, 12 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2000).
177. Id. 23, 28, 82.
178. Id. 77.
179. Id.
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reckless disregard for the life of the person behind the door."'1 0 Rather,
the Court determined the police officers had used a disproportionate
degree of force. Accordingly, the Court concluded that Turkey had
violated the right to life norm set forth in Article 2 of the European
Convention.
In Giule v. Turkey, the European Court made clear that states
can be held responsible for extrajudicial killings even in the absence of
evidence that security forces directly targeted specific individuals. 8 '
The decedent in Gialeq was shot and killed in the midst of spontaneous
public demonstrations against the Turkish government. According to
the decedent's family, the deadly shot was fired by security forces. In
response, the government alleged the decedent had been killed by a
bullet fired by armed protestors. The European Commission on Human
Rights, which initially reviewed the claim, concluded the decedent
was killed by security forces. "2 Specifically, it determined that an
"armoured vehicle had opened fire in the main street, where the
demonstration was taking place, either in the air or at the ground,
in order to disperse the demonstrators, and that Ahmet Gtileq had
been hit by a fragment of a bullet fired from that vehicle that had
ricocheted off the ground or a wall.' ' 8 3 Significantly, the Commission
did not believe the killing was intentional. The Court accepted the
Commission's findings even in the absence of direct evidence that
government forces fired the deadly shot or that the decedent was
directly targeted. And while the Court acknowledged the public
demonstration was "far from peaceful," it concluded the use of deadly
force was disproportionate and was not absolutely necessary.8 4
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has developed
a similar jurisprudence on extrajudicial killing. In Caracazo v.
Venezuela, the Inter-American Court considered a case involving the
use of force by police during a state of emergency proclaimed by
the Venezuelan government. 185 The state of emergency, and an
accompanying curfew, was in response to civil protests arising out of
government economic policies. During the state of emergency, police
180. Id. 80.
181. GUleg v. Turkey, App. No. 54/1997/838/1044, 1 80 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July
27, 1998).
182. Id. 68.
183. Id.
184. Id. IT 70, 73, 83.
185. Case of the Caracazo v. Venezuela, Merits, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 58, 1 (Nov. 11, 1999).
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and military personnel conducted a series of operations to suppress the
protests. As part of their suppression operations, police and military
personnel engaged in indiscriminate shootings which resulted in
the death of numerous civilians in their villages and surrounding
communities. 186 Significantly, some of the victims were not even
engaged in civil protests but were instead hiding in their homes. 187 The
Inter-American Court found that such actions constituted extrajudicial
killings and violated the right to life norm.
8 8
As evidenced through this diverse array of international
instruments and as reflected in the practice of human rights courts and
human rights bodies, an extrajudicial killing is a deliberated killing
that is not authorized by a regularly constituted court that affords all
the applicable due process protections or that is not otherwise justified
under international law. This definition applies in times of peace and
times of armed conflict. 8 9 The intentional targeting of victims is but
one form of extrajudicial killing. Other forms of extrajudicial killing
include indiscriminate attacks using lethal force and excessive use of
lethal force by state actors. 190
186. Id. %% 2(h), 2(k).
187. Id. 2(k).
188. Id. 42. See also Nadege Dorzema v. Dominican Republic, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 251, %% 96-97 (Oct. 24,
2012) (finding that the shooting of fleeing individuals constituted extrajudicial
killings and was a violation of the right to life norm); Massacres of El Mozote and
Nearby Places v. El Salvador, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 252, 4, 70-72 (Oct. 25, 2012) (finding the indiscriminate killing of
civilians in a village violated the same norm); Montero-Aranguren et al. v.
Venezuela, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 150, 63, 72 (July 5, 2006) (finding that the excessive use of force
by law enforcement officials against inmates that resulted in deaths constituted
violations of the right to life).
189. SCHABAS II, supra note 158, at 153 ("The [European] Court has not left
any doubt about the fact that it considers the obligations imposed by the European
Convention, including the procedural obligation of article 2, to apply during armed
conflict.") (citation omitted); BURGORGUE-LARSEN & UBEDA DE TORRES, supra note
158, at 334 ("The Inter-American Court has consistently stated that 'instead of
exonerating the State from its obligations to respect and guarantee human rights,'
the existence of a conflict, be it armed or international, 'obliged it to act in
accordance with such obligations.') (citation omitted).
190. See MELZER, supra note 140, at 3-5; INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS, supra
note 154, at 66; Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human
Rights and Law Enforcement: A Trainer's Guide on Human Rights, 15, U.N. Doc.
HR/P/PT/5/Add.2 (2002).
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B. The Procedural Component
The prohibition against extrajudicial killing includes a
procedural component. The procedural component creates an
obligation on states to "investigate potentially unlawful deaths, assign
responsibility and remedy violations." '19 1 When a state knows or should
know that an unlawful killing has occurred, it is required to conduct a
prompt, effective, impartial, and transparent investigation. 192 This
obligation "gives practical effect to the duties to respect and protect
the right to life, and promotes accountability and remedy where the
substantive right may have been violated." 193 Where appropriate, the
procedural component also requires prosecution of perpetrators who
commit an extrajudicial killing. "Where an investigation reveals
evidence that a death was caused unlawfully, the State must ensure
that identified perpetrators are prosecuted and, where appropriate,
punished through a judicial process." 194 Finally, the procedural
component requires states to provide the families of victims with a full
and effective remedy, including reparations.1 95
The procedural component of the prohibition against
extrajudicial killing has been recognized in numerous cases. In
Florentina Olmedo v. Paraguay, the U.N. Human Rights Committee
acknowledged a violation of the procedural component when Paraguay
failed to conduct a meaningful investigation following the lethal use of
force by state actors. In this case, the National Police attacked a group
of demonstrators who had blocked a road to protest government
policies. 196 The police used overwhelming force, including tear gas,
water cannons, and firearms, to disperse the crowd. The decedent
was shot and killed at point blank range by the police. While the
191. Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary
executions, J 20, U.N. Doc. A/71/372 (Sept. 2, 2016).
192. Minnesota Protocol, supra note 103, at 7-8. See generally MELZER,
supra note 140, at 431 ("All major human rights bodies have held that the
obligations flowing from the right to life necessarily entail a duty of the State to
investigate deprivations of life on the part of its agents, and that non-compliance
with this duty may in and of itself amount to a violation of the right to life.")
(citation omitted); see also BURGORGUE-LARSEN & AMAYA UBEDA DE TORRES, supra
note 158, at 345-47.
193. Minnesota Protocol, supra note 103, at 4.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Florentina Olmedo v. Paraguay, Commc'n No. 1828/2008, 2.6 (Hum.
Rts. Comm. 2012).
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government opened an inquiry into the death, it made little progress
and reached no conclusions. The U.N. Human Rights Committee
indicated that the government had an obligation to protect the
lives of the demonstrators.19 7 But, the Committee also indicated the
government had an obligation to conduct a meaningful investigation.
"The Committee refers to its jurisprudence, according to which both a
criminal investigation and consequential prosecution are necessary
remedies for violations of human rights such as those protected by
article 6." 198 For these reasons, the Committee concluded that a
violation "may therefore arise as a result of a State party's failure to
take appropriate measures to investigate and punish or redress such a
violation."199
In Mocanu v. Romania, the European Court of Human Rights
made a similar determination. In this case, Romanian security forces
were ordered to disperse demonstrators at an anti-government protest
by firing at them. Several shots ricocheted and struck the victim while
he was walking near the demonstration. Despite the victim's death,
the government failed to conduct a meaningful investigation. The
European Court indicated that the prohibition against the arbitrary
deprivation of life "would be ineffective in practice if there existed no
procedure either for reviewing the lawfulness of the use of lethal force
by State authorities, or for investigating arbitrary killings .... 200
Accordingly, some form of effective official investigation is required.
This obligation exists even in cases of armed conflict or generalized
violence where circumstances may make it difficult to engage in a
thorough investigation. 20 1 To be effective, the investigation must be
independent.20 2 It must be thorough.203 And, it must be able to lead to
the punishment of the perpetrators. 20 4 In Mocanu, the investigation
was neither independent nor thorough. Accordingly, the Court held
197. Id. [ 7.5.
198. Id. 1 7.3 (citations omitted).
199. Id. See also JOSEPH & CASTAN, supra note 158, at 176-79 (summarizing
various cases before the HRC in which the Committee affirmed that states have
positive obligations to investigate and provide redress for violations of human
rights).
200. Mocanu v. Romania, App. Nos. 10865/09, 45886/07, and 32431/08, T 316
(Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 17, 2014) (citations omitted).
201. Id. 319.
202. Id. 320.
203. Id. 325.
204. Id. 321.
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that Romania had violated the procedural component of the right to
life norm. 20
5
In Montero-Aranguren v. Venezuela, the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights examined the state's obligation to provide an effective
remedy when claims of extrajudicial killing are raised.20 6 In this case,
security personnel used excessive force in responding to an alleged
disturbance at a prison, resulting in the death of dozens of prisoners.
The Inter-American Court indicated that "[ulpon learning that
members of the security forces have used firearms causing lethal
consequences, the State must immediately initiate a rigorous,
impartial and effective investigation ex officio."2 7 According to the
Court, the failure of state authorities to take such action violated the
right to life norm contained in the American Convention.20 8
In sum, the prohibition against extrajudicial killing regulates
a state's use of lethal force at every stage. States must train their
security forces on the proper use of lethal force. When lethal force
is used, it must comply with the principles of necessity, distinction,
proportionality, and precaution. Finally, states must conduct a
thorough investigation when lethal force is used and hold perpetrators
of extrajudicial killings accountable for their actions.
205. See also McCann and Others v. United Kingdom, App. No. 18984/91,
161 (Eur. Ct. H.R., Sept. 27, 1995) (noting that states must carry out an "effective
official investigation when individuals have been killed as a result of the use of force
by, inter alios, agents of the State."); see generally Juliet Chevalier-Watts, Effective
Investigations Under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 21
EUR. J. INT'L L. 701 (2010) (considering the jurisprudence of the duty to investigate
deaths resulting from the actions of state agents).
206. Montero-Aranguren v. Venezuela, Preliminary Objection, Merits,
Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 150 (July 5,
2006).
207. Id. 79.
208. See also Nadege Dorzema v. Dominican Republic, Merits, Reparations
and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 251, $ 101 (Oct. 24, 2012)
(stating "[t]he general prohibition for State officials to arbitrarily deprive life
would be ineffective if no procedures existed to verify the legality of the use of lethal
force exercised by State agents."); Myrna Mack Chang v. Guatemala, Merits,
Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 101, 157 (Nov.
25, 2003) (stating "[s]afeguarding the right to life requires conducting an effective
official investigation when there are persons who lost their life as a result of the
use of force by agents of the State.").
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IV. MAMANI V. BERZAIN: A PUZZLING INTERPRETATION
While the prohibition against extrajudicial killing is firmly
established and its meaning well-defined under international law, the
definition has been subject to some dispute in U.S. courts. Mamani v.
Berzain offers an instructive (yet puzzling) narrative on how some
federal courts assess claims of extrajudicial killing.
In Mamani v. Berzain, a group of Bolivian nationals filed
separate lawsuits against Gonzalo Sdnchez de Lozada, the former
President of Bolivia, and Jos6 Carlos Sdnchez Berzain, the former
Defense Minister of Bolivia, alleging extrajudicial killing, crimes
against humanity, and several other claims. 209 The allegations of
extrajudicial killing were raised under the ATS and TVPA. The two
lawsuits were eventually consolidated in the federal district court for
the Southern District of Florida, and the plaintiffs filed an Amended
Consolidated Complaint on May 16, 2008.211
The claims in Mamani arose out of public protests against the
Bolivian government's economic and energy policies. The plaintiffs
alleged the defendants had planned and ordered military operations in
several villages to suppress the protests. These military operations
resulted in the extrajudicial killing of dozens of civilians.
The Defendants' response to the protests of September
and October 2003 was to order Bolivian security forces,
including military sharpshooters armed with high-
powered rifles and soldiers and police wielding
machine guns, to attack and kill scores of unarmed
civilians, many of whom-including the victims on
whose behalf Plaintiffs are suing-were not involved
in the protests at all, and who were not even in the
vicinity of the protests. In all, security forces under
the direction of Defendants intentionally killed 67
209. Complaint, Mamani v. Sanchez Berzain, No. 07-22459-Civ-Jordan (S.D.
Fla. Sept. 19, 2007); Complaint, Mamani v. Sanchez de Lozada, No. 07-cv-2507 (D.
Md. Sept. 19, 2007). While the complaints addressed extrajudicial killing as a
discrete claim, they also raised separate claims of violations of the right to life,
liberty, and security of person.
210. Amended Consolidated Complaint, Mamani v. Sanchez de Lozada, Nos.
08-21063-Civ & 07-22459-Civ (S.D. Fla. May 16, 2008).
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and injured over 400, primarily members of Bolivia's
indigenous Aymara communities. 211
The plaintiffs alleged the two defendants were responsible for
these killings under several theories of liability, including command
responsibility, conspiracy, and aiding and abetting. 212 They alleged
that the defendants possessed and exercised command and control over
the Bolivian military as well as the police. 213 They further alleged the
defendants had planned the widespread attacks against civilians and
knew that civilians had been targeted with lethal force.211 In addition,
the plaintiffs alleged the defendants failed to stop the extrajudicial
killings and failed to investigate these acts or punish personnel for
committing these acts. 21 5
In response to the Amended Consolidated Complaint, the
defendants filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the court lacked
jurisdiction to hear the case and that the plaintiffs had not pled
sufficient facts to support their claims. 216 The defendants asserted the
court lacked jurisdiction pursuant to the political question doctrine, the
act of state doctrine, and immunity principles. They also asserted the
plaintiffs had failed to allege any violations of international law. They
argued, inter alia, that the TVPA claims should be dismissed because
the plaintiffs had not exhausted their domestic remedies in Bolivia as
required by the TVPA. 217
The district court issued two separate opinions addressing the
defendants' challenges to the lawsuit. On June 19, 2009, the district
court agreed to dismiss the TVPA claims. 218 It noted that the
exhaustion of domestic remedies is an explicit requirement under the
TVPA. Accordingly, the plaintiffs were required to seek compensation
in Bolivia before they could proceed with their TVPA claims. Because
the plaintiffs had failed to do so, the court dismissed their TVPA
claims. 219 However, the dismissal was without prejudice, thereby
211. Id. at 1.
212. Id. at 18-20.
213. Id. at 18.
214. Id. at 19.
215. Id. at 20.
216. Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss, Mamani v. Sanchez de Lozada,
Nos. 07-22459 & 08-21063 (S.D. Fla. May 30, 2008).
217. Id. at 34-36.
218. See Mamani v. Berzain, 636 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1332 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
219. Id. at 1333.
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allowing the plaintiffs the opportunity to refile their TVPA claims after
they exhausted their remedies under Bolivian law.
220
On November 25, 2009, the district court addressed the
defendants' remaining challenges. 221 The court began by rejecting the
defendants' jurisdictional challenges regarding the political question
doctrine and the act of state doctrine. 222 The court determined there
were judicially manageable standards available to assess the plaintiffs'
claims and that comity principles did not prevent the court from
considering these claims. The court also rejected the defendants'
assertions that the FSIA or the common law doctrine of head-of-state
immunity applied to bar the lawsuit.
223
The district court then assessed whether the claims of
extrajudicial killing met the standards for ATS liability and whether
the plaintiffs had pled sufficient facts to support such claims.224 While
the district court acknowledged that extrajudicial killing is a violation
of international law and actionable under the ATS, the court also noted
"it is not clear what constitutes an extrajudicial killing." 225 The court
reviewed several cases litigated under the ATS, TVPA, and FSIA to
identify examples of extrajudicial killings. 226 It determined that "courts
have upheld claims for extrajudicial killings when a political opponent
has been specifically targeted (most commonly through assassinations)
or when innocent civilians have been attacked without provocation." 227
220. Id.
221. See Mamani v. Berzain, 2009 WL 10664387 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 25, 2009).
222. Id. at *4-12.
223. Id. at *12-13. The Bolivian government had previously waived any
immunity that the defendants could claim as former foreign government officials
which is a prerequisite for jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (2016).
224. Id. at *14-15.
225. Id. at *15.
226. Mamani, 2009 WL 10664387, at *15. The FSIA incorporates the TVPA's
definition of extrajudicial killing.
227. Id. The district court referenced several cases that addressed claims of
extrajudicial killings under the TVPA and FSIA. See Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios,
402 F.3d 1148, 1152 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that a jury could conclude that the
decedent was a victim of an extrajudicial killing where defendant selected him-a
political prisoner-for execution, drove him out of prison in a truck, and repeatedly
stabbed him to death); Wachsman ex rel. Wachsman v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
603 F. Supp. 2d 148, 155 (D.D.C. 2009) (finding abduction and execution of unarmed
civilian falls within the FSIA's definition of extrajudicial killing); Lizarbe v.
Hurtado, Case No. 07-21783, Order [D.E. 33] (S.D. Fla. Mar. 4, 2008) (Jordan, J.)
(awarding damages for extrajudicial killings where Peruvian security forces
entered village, rounded up unarmed civilians, beat the men, raped some of the
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On the other hand, "a soldier's killing of an armed attacker in self-
defense" would not be considered an extrajudicial killing.228
The district court then considered the allegations of
extrajudicial killing set forth in the Amended Consolidated Complaint
to determine whether they alleged "sufficient facts to plausibly suggest
that the killings were targeted."2 9 The court determined that seven
plaintiffs had pled sufficient facts to support their claims. However,
two of the plaintiffs had not pled sufficient facts, and their claims were
accordingly dismissed. 2 0
The district court also considered the defendants' argument
that an "extrajudicial killing requires a showing of custody or control."
It rejected this argument, noting that "[c] ourts have generally required
that claims for extrajudicial killing be conducted under actual or
apparent authority, or color of law, of a foreign nation."2 31 According to
the court, it was sufficient that the plaintiffs alleged "their relatives
were killed by the Bolivian armed forces" and that the armed forces
acted under the defendants' authority.232
In addition to the extrajudicial killing claim, the district court
allowed the claim for crimes against humanity to proceed. The court
found that "crimes against humanity are recognized as violations of
women, and ultimately used machine guns and grenades to kill villagers who had
done nothing to present a public threat); Bakhtiar v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 571
F. Supp. 2d 27, 34 (D.D.C. 2008) (former prime minister's murder and mutilation
met the definition of an extrajudicial killing under the TVPA); Oveissi v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 498 F. Supp. 2d 268, 275-76 (D.D.C. 2007) (gunning down former
chief of armed forces on a street qualified as an extrajudicial killing); Alejandre v.
Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239, 1248 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (Cuban Air Force
committed extrajudicial killings in violation of the TVPA when it shot down
unarmed, civilian airplanes on a humanitarian mission in international waters:
"[Tihe unprovoked firing of deadly rockets at defenseless, unarmed civilian aircraft
undoubtedly comes within the statute's meaning of 'extrajudicial killing.'");
Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 138 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (assuming that the
assassination of political opponent fell within TVPA's definition of extrajudicial
killing).
228. Mamani, 2009 WL 10664387, at *15.
229. Id. at *16.
230. Id. at *16-17.
231. Id. at *17 (citing Doe v. Saravia and Tachiona v. Mugabe for support. In
both cases, the victims' deaths constituted extrajudicial killings even though they
were not in the custody or control of state actors. Doe v. Saravia, 348 F. Supp. 2d
1112 (E.D. Cal. 2004); Tachiona v. Mugabe, 234 F. Supp. 2d 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)).
232. Id.
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international law. 233 According to the court, crimes against humanity
require "a widespread or systematic attack directed against any
civilian population. " 234 The court then determined the plaintiffs had
pled sufficient facts to support their claims.235
In contrast, the district court dismissed the claims involving
the rights to life, liberty, and security of persons as well as the freedom
of assembly and association.2 36 Unlike extrajudicial killing and crimes
against humanity, the court found that these other claims lacked
the required specificity for litigation. Notably, the court did not
acknowledge the connection between the right to life norm and
extrajudicial killing. The cases cited by the court in support of
dismissal also did not acknowledge the connection.
237
Finally, the district court found that command responsibility
offered a viable theory of secondary liability. Relying on circuit
precedent, the court identified three elements to command
responsibility:
(1) the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship
between the commander and the perpetrator of the
crime;
(2) that the commander knew or should have known,
owing to the circumstances at the time, that his
subordinates had committed, were committing, or
planned to commit acts violative of the laws of war; and
(3) that the commander failed to prevent the
commission of the crimes, or failed to punish the
subordinates after the commission of the crimes.
238
233. Mamani, 2009 WL 10664387, at *17 (citing Cabello, 402 F.3d at 1161;
Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, NA, Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1247 (11th Cir. 2005)).
234. Id.
235. Id. at *17-20.
236. Id. at *21.
237. The court referenced the following cases: Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp.,
414 F.3d 233, 254 (2d Cir. 2003); Bowoto v. Chevron Corporation, 557 F. Supp. 2d
1080, 1095 (N.D. Cal. 2008); Saperstein v. Palestinian Auth., 2006 WL 3804718, at
*8 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 2006); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 456 F. Supp. 2d
457, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). Id.
238. Id. at *20 (quoting Ford ex rel. Estate of Ford v. Garcia, 289 F.3d 1283,
1288 (11th Cir. 2002)).
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The court rejected the defendants' arguments that command
responsibility was limited to violations of the laws of war. 239 It
concluded that the plaintiffs had pled sufficient allegations to support
a claim under the theory of command responsibility. 24 0
The defendants subsequently petitioned the Eleventh Circuit
for interlocutory review of the district court's decision regarding the
extrajudicial killing claims. 241 The Eleventh Circuit granted the
request for interlocutory review and, on August 29, 2011, it reversed
the district court's ruling on extrajudicial killing. 242 Its analysis can be
divided into three sections.
First, the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that extrajudicial
killing and crimes against humanity are recognized violations of
international law. 24 3 In support, it cited circuit precedent that had
already established the viability of such claims under the ATS.244
Despite this acknowledgement, the court made several statements
implying that extrajudicial killing may not be sufficiently clear to
justify such a finding. It noted, for example, that "the pertinent
international law is not already clear, definite, or universal enough to
reach the alleged conduct. '245 The court seemed to distinguish between
extrajudicial killing as a general matter and the extrajudicial killing
claims as alleged by the plaintiffs.
Second, the Eleventh Circuit considered the meaning of
extrajudicial killing.246 Even though the district court dismissed the
TVPA claims, the Eleventh Circuit relied on the statute's definition of
extrajudicial killing to inform its analysis of the corresponding ATS
claims. The court assumed "for purposes of this discussion that an
extrajudicial killing falling within the statutory definition of the TVPA
239. Id.
240. Id. at *21.
241. The district court granted the defendants' motion for certification for
interlocutory appeal on Mar. 17, 2010. Mamani v. Berzain, No. 07-22459-CIV, 2010
WL 11442696, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 17, 2010).
242. Mamani v. Berzain, 654 F.3d 1148, 1157 (11th Cir. 2011).
243. Id. at 1152.
244. Id. (citing Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1316 (11th Cir.
2008); Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148, 1151-52 (11th Cir. 2005)).
245. Id. at 1157.
246. The Eleventh Circuit expressed its agreement with the district court's
statement that the meaning of extrajudicial killing is not clear. Id. at 1155.
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would also likely violate established international law." 247 It noted,
however, that this may not always be true.
24s
The Eleventh Circuit stated that not all deliberated killings
constitute an extrajudicial killing.249 According to the court, something
more is required: deaths must be 'deliberate' in the sense of being
undertaken with studied consideration and purpose."25 0 Thus, "some
targeting [is] not enough to state a claim of extrajudicial killing under
already established and specifically defined international law."251
Third, the Eleventh Circuit considered the nature of the
plaintiffs' claims against the defendants and whether the Amended
Consolidated Complaint offered plausible claims for relief or only
conclusory allegations. 252 The court based its analysis on the
heightened pleading standards set forth by the Supreme Court in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal.25 3
We must determine whether these facts, taken as a
whole and drawing reasonable inferences in favor
of plaintiffs, are sufficient to make out a plausible
claim that these defendants did things that violated
established international law and gave rise to
jurisdiction under the ATS. We do not accept that, even
if some soldiers or policemen committed wrongful acts,
present international law embraces strict liability akin
to respondeat superior for national leaders at the top of
the long chain of command in a case like this one.
25 4
Reviewing the allegations in the Amended Consolidated
Complaint, the court indicated they resembled "statements of legal
conclusions rather than true factual allegations."255 The court noted
247. Id. at 1154 n.7.
248. In support, the court cited to Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, NA.,
where the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged the distinction between the TVPA's
definition of torture and the definition under international law. Id. (citing Aldana
v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, NA, Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1252 (11th Cir. 2005)).
249. Id. at 1155.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 1153.
253. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 662-65 (2009); Mamani v. Berzain, 654
F.3d 1148, 1153 (11th Cir. 2011).
254. Mamani, 654 F.3d at 1154 (emphasis in original).
255. Id. at 1153.
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the defendants were not accused of directing soldiers to target the
decedents.
Plaintiffs here base their claims on allegations that
defendants knew or should have known of wrongful
violence taking place and failed in their duty to prevent
it. Easy to say about leaders of nations but without
adequate factual support of more specific acts by these
defendants, these 'bare assertions' are 'not entitled to
be assumed true.'25 6
With respect to the individual deaths, the court suggested that
each of them "could plausibly have been the result of precipitate
shootings during an ongoing civil uprising," and no facts showed
the "deaths were 'deliberate' in the sense of being undertaken with
studied consideration and purpose."257 The court also suggested the
deaths could have been the result of an "accidental or negligent
shooting (including mistakenly identifying a target as a person who
did pose a threat to others), individual motivations (personal reasons)
not linked to defendants, and so on."' 25 8 Finally, the court stated
that the "[p]laintiffs have not pleaded facts sufficient to show that
anyone-especially these defendants, in their capacity as high-level
officials-committed extrajudicial killings within the meaning of
established international law."25 9
In a footnote, the Eleventh Circuit offered a slight qualification
to its analysis. 260 It acknowledged the factual allegations in the
complaint could establish liability for extrajudicial killing by the actual
256. Id. at 1153-54 (emphasis in original) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681).
257. Id. at 1155.
258. Id. The Eleventh Circuit distinguished this case from its prior decision
in Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, which upheld an ATS claim for extrajudicial
killing. Id. (citing Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148 (11th Cir. 2005)).
According to the court, "[t]he specific targeting of the victim based on his political
beliefs, direct involvement of the defendant, and premeditated and deliberate
circumstances of the victim's death set Cabello apart from the facts alleged in this
case." Mamani, 654 F.3d at 1155 n.9.
259. Mamani, 654 F.3d at 1155 (emphasis in original) (referencing Belhas v.
Ya'alon, 515 F.3d 1279, 1293 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (William J., concurring) ("[Plaintiffs]
point to no case where similar high-level decisions on military tactics and strategy
during a modern military operation have been held to constitute... extrajudicial
killing under international law.")).
260. Id. at 1155 n.8.
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shooters. But, this case involved different allegations against a
different group of defendants. While the court did not preclude the
possibility of aiding and abetting liability or conspiratorial liability, it
found the pleadings did not offer sufficient facts to support such
claims.2 6
1
On remand, the district court granted the plaintiffs leave to
amend their complaint. And, on June 21, 2013, the plaintiffs filed their
Second Amended Consolidated Complaint under the ATS and TVPA
alleging extrajudicial killing, crimes against humanity, and wrongful
death under state law.262 In response to the Eleventh Circuit's earlier
decision, the plaintiffs offered additional factual allegations in support
of their claims. For example, the complaint identified specific decisions
made by the defendants that resulted in extrajudicial killings:
[On more than one occasion, the defendants candidly
discussed with each other and with advisors how many
civilian deaths would be necessary to effectively block
active opposition to their plans. Defendants made a
conscious decision that thousands of unlawful killings
would be both necessary and acceptable to deter
protests. For example, in a meeting before the 2002
elections, the defendants agreed that they would have
to kill 2,000 or 3,000 people in order to ensure that
popular opposition would not block their proposals.
[Als part of the implementation of their plan, once
in office the defendants issued secret decrees that
authorized the Bolivian Armed Forces to respond to
protests in civilian communities with lethal military
tactics, rather than law enforcement procedures. The
unlawful decrees authorized the Armed Forces to treat
unarmed Bolivian civilians as if they were armed,
enemy combatants who could be shot and killed on
sight.263
261. Id.
262. Second Amended Consolidated Complaint at 1, Mamani v. Sanchez de
Lozada, Nos. 08-21063-CV & 07-22459-CV (S.D. Fla. June 21, 2013).
263. Id. at 1-2.
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The plaintiffs further alleged that "the troops were ordered to
use lethal munitions and to shoot 'at anything that moved.' ' 264 As
a result of these policies, the plaintiffs alleged that several innocent
civilians were killed, none of whom were armed or threatening the
security forces. The complaint described several civilian deaths,
including the death of an eight-year-old child who was fatally shot
inside her home and a pregnant woman who was also killed while
sitting in her home.2 6 5 The complaint described how other individuals
were killed as they sought to hide from the attacks or fled into the
surrounding countryside. In total, the plaintiffs' alleged military
operations had killed 58 people and wounded over 400 others. 26 6 In
response, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Second Amended
Consolidated Complaint.2 6 7
On May 20, 2014, the district court dismissed the ATS claims
pursuant to the Supreme Court's 2013 decision in Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co., which precluded ATS claims that did not "touch
and concern" the United States with sufficient force to overcome the
presumption against extraterritoriality. 26s However, the court allowed
the TVPA claims to proceed. The court rejected the defendants'
assertion that the plaintiffs' receipt of compensation in Bolivia
precluded them from now bringing TVPA claims in the United
States.26 9
In assessing the claims of extrajudicial killing, the court
interpreted the Eleventh Circuit's prior decision as establishing a two-
step inquiry: "(1) do the non-conclusory factual allegations in the
Complaint plausibly suggest that Plaintiffs' relatives' deaths were
extrajudicial killings; and (2) if so, do they also plausibly suggest that
Defendants are secondarily liable for the killings?"2 10
With respect to the first prong, the district court determined
that the Second Amended Consolidated Complaint plausibly suggested
that the victims were subjected to extrajudicial killings. The court
264. Id. at 18-19.
265. Id. at 19, 29.
266. Id. at 2.
267. Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended
Consolidated Complaint and Incorporated Memorandum of Law, Mamani v.
Sanchez, Nos. 08-21063 & 07-22459 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 19, 2013).
268. Mamani v. Berzain, 21 F. Supp. 3d 1353, 1369 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (citing
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124-25 (2013)).
269. Id. at 1373.
270. Id. at 1374.
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noted that the Bolivian military had been ordered to shoot "at anything
that moved" and to "shoot at any head that you see."2 7 1 Reviewing each
of the alleged killings, the court determined the facts plausibly
suggested that each killing was deliberate and, therefore, that they
constituted extrajudicial killings.17 2
With respect to the second prong, the district court determined
the complaint also plausibly suggested that the defendants were
responsible for extrajudicial killing under the doctrine of command
responsibility. The court indicated that if certain elements are met,
commanders can be held liable for the acts of their subordinates "even
where the commander did not order those acts. . .. "213 The court then
identified the three elements for command responsibility: (1) a
superior-subordinate relationship; (2) knowledge; and (3) failure to
act.274 The court found the facts in the Second Amended Consolidated
Complaint plausibly suggested each element had been met, which
would subject the defendants to secondary liability.275
The Eleventh Circuit subsequently granted the defendants'
request for interlocutory review of the district court's decision on two
issues: (1) whether the plaintiffs had met the exhaustion of domestic
remedies requirement as required by the TVPA; and (2) whether the
plaintiffs had adequately pled claims under the TVPA.2 7 6 On June 16,
2016, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling that the
plaintiffs had fulfilled the TVPA's exhaustion of domestic remedies
requirement. 277 However, it declined to consider the district court's
denial of the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim because the
defendants' challenges did not involve a pure question of law. The court
concluded that interlocutory review was inappropriate because the
defendants were seeking review of the factual allegations supporting
the claims of extrajudicial killing and command responsibility. 278
271. Id. at 1374-75.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 1375 (citing 1991 Senate TVPA Report).
274. Mamani, 21 F. Supp. 3d at 1376.
275. Id. at 1377-78.
276. Mamani v. Berzain, 825 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2016).
277. Id. at 1309-12.
278. Id. at 1312-13.
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Following the Eleventh Circuit's decision, the district court
scheduled the case for trial in March 2018 and authorized discovery. 27 9
At the conclusion of discovery, the defendants renewed the arguments
raised in their motion to dismiss by filing a motion for summary
judgment.2 8 0 In their motion, they argued, inter alia, that the plaintiffs
could not support their TVPA claims and that there was no support for
their claims of secondary liability.
On February 14, 2018, the district court denied the defendants'
motion for summary judgment and scheduled the case for trial. 2 1 The
court addressed several issues. First, the district court considered
whether there was a genuine dispute regarding the deliberated nature
of the killings. It noted that, "a reasonable jury, considering the
evidence of Defendants' plan to kill civilians to quash public opposition
to their policies, could find that decedents' deaths were deliberated
because they were the expected and desired outcome of this plan. '2 2
The court referenced several factual assertions proffered by the
plaintiffs which supported such an inference.
(1) changes in Bolivian military doctrine during
Defendant Lozada's administration to define
protesters as subversives who could be targeted
with military force; (2) a pattern of soldiers being
ordered to shoot unarmed civilians in multiple
different locations, including each location where
decedents were killed, on multiple different dates;
(3) a pattern of soldiers shooting indiscriminately
at civilians at times when witnesses saw no armed
protesters or anything indicating that the soldiers
were firing defensively; (4) Defendants' repeated
refusal to seriously commit to achieving peaceful,
negotiated solutions to protests; and (5) consistent
279. Order Lifting Stay and Setting Case for Trial and Order of Reference to
United States Magistrate Judge for Pretrial Discovery Matters, Nos. 08-21063-CV
& 07-22459-CV (S.D. Fla. Oct. 4, 2016).
280. Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion for
Summary Judgment, Mamani v. Sanchez, Nos. 08-21063 & 07-22459 (S.D. Fla.
Nov. 28, 2017).
281. Mamani v. Berzain, 309 F. Supp. 3d 1274, 1280, 1317 (S.D. Fla. 2018).
282. Id. at 1301.
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with Defendants' plan, the utilization of troops
from eastern Bolivia.
28 3
In addition, the district court dismissed the defendants' efforts
to narrow the meaning of deliberated killings. It concluded that the
plaintiffs need not "identify the specific soldier who fired each lethal
shot and introduce evidence regarding what that soldier was 'doing,
seeing, hearing . . . processing,' or thinking at the time of the
shooting. " 2 84 While the district court acknowledged that decedents
must have been intentionally killed by the Bolivian military, such
intent "need not necessarily be shown with evidence regarding each
individual shooter's state of mind. '28 5 Rather, intent could be inferred
from the specific facts of the case. For example, intent could be inferred
"by proof that decedents' deaths resulted from the implementation of
Defendants' plan to use military force to kill unarmed civilians."8 ' The
court cited several cases that recognized "that individualized targeting
is not required to make out a claim under the TVPA's definition of
extrajudicial killing. "287
Second, the district court considered whether the plaintiffs had
introduced sufficient evidence to raise jury questions as to whether
the decedents were killed by the Bolivian military and whether "the
killings were incompatible with accidental or negligent shootings,
'precipitate shootings during an ongoing civil uprising' and shootings
based on 'individual motivations ... not linked to defendants.' 2 8 8 On
this question, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had introduced
sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute for the jury to consider.
The court noted, for example, that the plaintiffs were not required to
show that only the military was shooting in the areas where decedents
were killed.
283. Id. at 1302.
284. Id. (citations omitted). The court added that superior officers can be held
liable for the actions of their subordinates even if their subordinates cannot be
specifically identified. Id.
285. Id. at 1302.
286. Id.
287. Id. (citing Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 864 F.3d 751, 770 (D.C. Cir.
2017); Flanagan v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 190 F. Supp. 3d 138, 163 (D.D.C. 2016);
Jaramillo v. Naranjo, No. 10-21951-CIV, 2014 WL 4898210, at *13 (S.D. Fla. Sept.
14, 2014)).
288. Id. at 1303 (citations omitted).
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Even though there is evidence in this case that, in
certain of the areas where decedents were killed,
there was an isolated shot at the military or, in
other locations, a more substantial clash between the
military and armed protesters, this does not foreclose
a jury from reasonably finding that decedents were
intentionally killed by the military-as opposed to by
an armed protester, a member of the military who
believed he was shooting at an armed protester, or a
member of the military who was shooting at an armed
protester but accidentally or negligently struck one of
the decedents.28 9
According to the court, a jury could reasonably infer that a decedent
had been intentionally killed by the military by weighing "the
proximity of decedents' deaths to any armed conflict" with "the
evidence of the location and actions of troops in relation to where
decedents were shot." 290 A jury could also infer a decedent was
intentionally killed because of evidence "that troops were ordered to
shoot, and did shoot, indiscriminately at civilians in the immediate
vicinity of the decedent at the time of his or her death and [there was]
an absence of evidence of armed protesters in the area."291 The court
determined the plaintiffs had offered sufficient evidence to make such
findings with respect to each decedent.
Having addressed the extrajudicial killing claims, the district
court then considered whether the plaintiffs could proceed with their
claims of secondary liability. It determined that sufficient evidence had
been presented for a jury to conclude that the defendants were liable
under the doctrine of command responsibility as well as under theories
of agency and conspiracy. 292 Finally, the court concluded that the
plaintiffs' state law claims for wrongful death could proceed. Under
traditional conflict of law principles, the court determined Bolivian law
would provide the substantive law for assessing these claims. 293
The Mamani trial began on March 5, 2018 and lasted three
weeks. Dozens of witnesses testified about the military attacks that
killed their family members and friends.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 1310-12.
293. Id. at 1317.
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Eight plaintiffs testified about the deaths of their
family members, including: Etelvina Ramos Mamani
and Eloy Rojas Mamani, whose eight-year-old
daughter Marlene was killed in front of her
mother when a single shot was fired through the
window; Te6filo Baltazar Cerro, whose pregnant wife
Teodosia was killed after a bullet was fired through the
wall of a house; Felicidad Rosa Huanca Quispe, whose
69-year-old father Raul was shot and killed along a
roadside; and Gonzalo Mamani Aguilar, whose father
Arturo was shot and killed while tending his crops.
294
In addition to testimony from family members of the deceased,
witnesses described the military operations and the role of the
defendants in the planning and execution of these operations.
One witness, a former soldier in the Bolivian military,
testified about being ordered to shoot at "anything
that moves" in a civilian community, while another
recounted witnessing a military officer kill a soldier for
refusing to follow orders to shoot at unarmed civilians.
Witnesses recounted how tanks rolled through in the
streets and soldiers shot for hours on end. Others
testified about how the president and minister of
defense committed to a military option instead of
pursuing dialogue with community leaders to reach a
peaceful resolution. 29
5
At the conclusion of the trial proceedings, the court provided
the jury with instructions on various legal issues, including the distinct
theories of liability as well as the legal bases for the plaintiffs' claims.
296
To establish liability under the TVPA, the jury instructions indicated
the plaintiffs had to establish: (1) that their relative had died as a
result of an extrajudicial killing committed by a member of the Bolivian
military; and (2) that the defendant is liable for that death under one
294. Press Release, Center for Constitutional Rights, Jury Finds Former
Bolivian President and Defense Minister Responsible for Extrajudicial Killings of
Indigenous People in 2003 (Apr. 3, 2018), https://ccrjustice.orghome/press-cen
ter/press-releases/jury-finds-former-bolivian-president-and-defense-minister
[https:Hlperma.cc/RM7G-QCMK].
295. Id.
296. Court's Instructions to the Jury, Mamani v. Berzain, 825 F.3d 1304
(11th Cir. 2016) (Nos. 07-22459-CIV and 09-21063-CIV).
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of the alleged theories of liability. 27 The jury instructions defined
"extrajudicial killing" pursuant to the TVPA definition. To establish
that the defendants were liable for extrajudicial killing, the plaintiffs
were required to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that:
(1) The relative's death was the result of a deliberated
killing. A "deliberated killing" is one that is undertaken
with studied consideration and purpose. A deliberated
killing is not one that is the result of accidental or
negligent shooting (including mistakenly identifying
a target as a person who did pose a threat to others),
individual motivations (personal reasons) not linked to
Defendants' or precipitate shootings during an ongoing
civil uprising.
(2) A member of the Bolivian military deliberately
killed that relative while acting under the actual or
apparent authority, or color of law, of the Plurinational
State of Bolivia. Acts are done under color of law when
a person acts or purports to act in the performance of
official duties under any law, ordinance, or regulation.
and
(3) The killing was not previously authorized by ajudgment of a regularly constituted court affording
all the judicial guarantees which are recognized
as indispensable by civilized peoples. A "regularly
constituted court" is an independent and impartial
court established and organized in accordance with the
laws and procedures already in force in a country, and
it excludes all special tribunals (that is, courts or
tribunals created for a specific event).29
The court noted the parties had stipulated that none of the killings
were authorized by a regularly constituted court.
On April 3, 2018, the jury issued a unanimous verdict after
deliberating for six days, finding the two defendants, Gonzalo
Sdnchez de Lozada and Jos6 Carlos S6nchez Berzain, responsible
for the extrajudicial killings of the victims. 299 The jury found that
297. Id. at 8.
298. Id. at 9-10.
299. Tim Elfrink, South Florida Jury Finds Bolivian President Responsible
for Civilian Massacre by Military, MIAMI NEW TIMES (Apr. 4, 2018, 10:25 AM),
https://www.miaminewtimes.com/news/florida-jury-finds-bolivian-ex-president-def
ense-minister-responsible-for-black-october-civilian-killings-10234324 [https:/f
perma.cc/CZD2-JASX].
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Bolivian soldiers had committed extrajudicial killings and that the
defendants were responsible for these deaths under the doctrine of
command responsibility. The plaintiffs were awarded $10 million in
compensatory damages.
The jury's verdict was short-lived.
On May 30, 2018, the district court granted the defendants'
motion for judgment as a matter of law.3 0 0 Under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 50(a)(1)(B), a court should grant judgment as a matter of
law when the plaintiff presents no legally sufficient evidentiary basis
for a reasonable jury to find for him on a material element of his cause
of action. 30 1 While the court had rejected similar efforts during the
trial, the defendants renewed their request after the jury verdict. This
time, the court agreed, determining the plaintiffs had failed to present
any evidence that the defendants had killed civilians pursuant to a
plan and that the evidence that was presented at trial was "legally
insufficient to support the jury verdict rendered in their favor."
30 2
The district court's decision to grant a judgment to the
defendants as a matter of law was informed by the Eleventh Circuit's
2011 decision that an extrajudicial killing is a deliberated killing that
is 'undertaken with studied consideration and purpose.'" 30 3 Based on
this requirement, the district court found that absence of evidence
of a plan to kill civilians precluded TVPA liability because it meant
the killings were not deliberated. 304 The district court made this
determination for three reasons.
First, it found that evidence of multiple shootings resulting in
a total of fifty deaths, in the absence of additional information, is not
evidence of extrajudicial killings.3 0 5 According to the district court, it
would be unreasonable to infer from the timing, location, and number
of troops involved in these killings that the degree of timing and
coordination needed to establish deliberated killings was present. And,
300. Mamani v. Berzain, No. 07-22459-CIV, 2018 WL 2435173, at *13 (S.D.
Fla. May 30, 2018).
301. FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(1)(B) (The district court rejected similar motions
by the defendants at the conclusion of the plaintiffs' case as well as at the close of
evidence).
302. Mamani, 2018 WL 2435173, at *13.
303. Id. at *2 (quoting Mamani v. Berzain, 654 F.3d 1148, 1155 (11th Cir.
2011)).
304. Id. at *9.
305. Id.
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the magnitude of harm was insufficient to support an inference of
deliberateness. Something more is required from which the jury "could
reasonably infer (not merely speculate) that the shootings" were not
simply "disproportionate reactions to civil unrest or attacks on the
military ... -"06 Second, the district court determined that evidence
the defendants were advised against using military force but continued
to employ the military after civilians were killed is not evidence of
extrajudicial killings. 30 7 Again, the district court stated that additional
information was necessary for a reasonable jury to infer that the
"[diefendants chose the path of military intervention out of a desire to
intentionally kill unarmed civilians. '30 8 Third, the court concluded that
the totality of the evidence did not support a reasonable inference that
the victims were deliberately killed.30 9 "At most, the evidence in these
cases supports an inference that Defendants responded to civil unrest
in their country with a heavy hand, and that some unidentified
members of the Bolivian military fired upon civilians for unknown
reasons."310 According to the district court, such an inference is
insufficient to impose TVPA liability.
The district court acknowledged it did not "lightly set aside the
jury's verdict in these cases where each Plaintiff has suffered a tragic
loss and fought undeterred for justice-in both the United States and
Bolivia-for almost fifteen years." 311 But it concluded that the
plaintiffs' failure to "present a legally sufficient evidentiary basis for
TVPA liability" compelled judgment as a matter of law.312 The district
court's dismissal of the jury's unanimous verdict will inevitably be
appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, meaning the court will have another
opportunity to consider its earlier ruling and perhaps clarify its
approach to extrajudicial killing.
306. Id. at *10.
307. Id. at *11.
308. Id. at *12.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id. at *9.
312. Id.
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V. ASSESSING MAMANI AND THE MEANING OF EXTRAJUDICIAL
KILLING
Mamani v. Berzain offers a valuable framework for assessing
the prohibition against extrajudicial killing. While this Part focuses on
the Eleventh Circuit's 2011 decision in Mamani, its analysis is relevant
to other circuits as well as to other legal systems that consider claims
of extrajudicial killing.
A. Deconstructing the Mamani Litigation
At the outset, it is important to recognize that the district court
and the Eleventh Circuit were addressing the claims of extrajudicial
killing under different statutes (and different standards). Filed in
2008, the Amended Consolidated Complaint raised the extrajudicial
killing claims under both the ATS and TVPA. The TVPA claims were
initially dismissed by the district court for failure to exhaust domestic
remedies, leaving the ATS claims. In its 2011 decision, the Eleventh
Circuit considered the extrajudicial killing claims under the ATS.
After the case was dismissed by the Eleventh Circuit, the plaintiffs
filed a Second Amended Consolidated Complaint, again raising the
extrajudicial killing claims under both the ATS and TVPA. This time,
the ATS claims were dismissed pursuant to the Kiobel standard,
leaving the TVPA claims. Accordingly, the district court's 2014 and
2018 decisions considered the extrajudicial killing claims under the
TVPA.
While the Eleventh Circuit examined the extrajudicial killing
claims under the ATS in its 2011 decision, it still relied on the TVPA's
definition of extrajudicial killing to inform its analysis. The court
assumed "for purposes of this discussion that an extrajudicial killing
falling within the statutory definition of the TVPA would also likely
violate established international law."313 It noted, however, that this
assumption may not always hold true.3 14 In fact, the court suggested
it might read ATS claims more narrowly than TVPA claims. 31 5 In
313. Mamani v. Berzain, 654 F.3d 1148, 1154 n.7 (11th Cir. 2011).
314. Id. The Eleventh Circuit was distinguishing between the distinct
sources used for establishing ATS and TVPA claims. ATS claims are based on either
a U.S. treaty or customary international law and are defined by those sources. In
contrast, TVPA claims are defined by the statute. Id. (citing Romero v. Drummond
Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1316 (11th Cir. 2008)).
315. Id. at 1154 n.7.
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support, the court cited to its decision in Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh
Produce, N.A. 316 Relying on the Supreme Court's earlier decision in
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Eleventh Circuit in Aldana noted "that
neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has urged us to read the
TVPA as narrowly as we have been directed to read the Alien Tort Act
generally. 317
The distinct objectives of the ATS and TVPA reinforce the need
to interpret claims under the two statutes using different standards.
According to the Supreme Court, the principal objective of the ATS
is "to avoid foreign entanglements by ensuring the availability of a
federal forum where the failure to provide one might cause another
nation to hold the United States responsible for an injury to a foreign
citizen."31 8 For this reason, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to
interpret the ATS in a manner that might result in disputes with
foreign governments. The principal objective of the TVPA is far
different: "[t]o carry out obligations of the United States under
the United Nations Charter and other international agreements
pertaining to the protection of human rights by establishing a civil
action for recovery of damages from an individual who engages in
torture or extrajudicial killing. '319 Since the principal objective of the
TVPA is to carry out U.S. obligations under international human rights
law and provide a civil remedy to victims of torture and extrajudicial
killing, the statute should be interpreted accordingly.320 It should be
interpreted consistent with U.S. obligations under international
316. Id. (citing Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., 416 F.3d 1242,
1252 (11th Cir. 2005)).
317. Aldana, 416 F.3d at 1252 (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692,
725 (2004)); see also Doe v. Drummond Co., 782 F.3d 576, 606-07 (11th Cir. 2015)
(discussing the differing scopes of the TVPA and ATS).
318. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1397 (2018) (citation
omitted).
319. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73
(1992).
320. This language appears in the enrolled bill and the Statutes at Large as
a preamble to the TVPA, but it was omitted by the Office of Law Revision Counsel
when the TVPA was placed in the U.S. Code. See Torture Victim Protection Act of
1991, H.R. 2092, 102d Cong. (1992). However, the preamble is considered part of
the legislative enactment and, therefore, it should be accorded some weight in
statutory interpretation. See generally NORMAN SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, 2A
SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:4 (7th ed. 2017) (stating that while
the preamble of an act may not restrain or extend the meaning of an act where no
ambiguity exists, it may nonetheless be given some weight as part of the "whole
act" method of construction).
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human rights law. Additionally, it should be interpreted to provide a
remedy to victims of torture and extrajudicial killings. And, it should
certainly be interpreted more broadly than the ATS, which was
presumably adopted to avoid foreign entanglements.
The Supreme Court's decision in Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC
further highlights the distinction between the ATS and TVPA.32 1 In
Jesner, the Supreme Court held that foreign corporations are not
subject to civil liability under the Alien Tort Statute, thereby
reinforcing its desire to avoid foreign entanglements absent an explicit
congressional mandate. 322 The plurality in Jesner found such a
mandate in the TVPA, which Congress drafted to "'establish an
unambiguous and modem basis for a cause of action' under the ATS"
and which "reflects Congress' considered judgment of the proper
structure for a right of action under the ATS." 323 In her dissenting
opinion, Justice Sotomayor acknowledged the significance of the TVPA
as well as the status of the prohibition against extrajudicial killing as
a norm that has generated international consensus.
3 24
In sum, courts should interpret the TVPA consistently with its
congressional mandate which, as indicated, is quite different from
the ATS. 325 This understanding should inform both the meaning of
the Eleventh Circuit's 2011 Mamani decision as well as future
interpretations of the TVPA.
According to the Eleventh Circuit, not all deliberated killings
constitute an extrajudicial killing.326 This is an accurate statement if it
is referencing the TVPA's text, which states that an extrajudicial
killing is a "deliberated killing not authorized by previous judgment
pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized
321. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1389-91.
322. Id. at 1389, 1407.
323. Id. at 1403 (Kennedy, J.,) (citations omitted). For a critique of the
plurality's analysis of the relationship between the ATS and TVPA, see William J.
Aceves, Correcting an Evident Error: A Plea to Revise Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC,
107 GEo. L.J. ONLINE 63 (2018).
324. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1420 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
325. Cf Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 864 F.3d 751, 772 (D.C. Cir. 2017)
(holding that Congress intended the TVPA to reach a broader range of conduct than
what is prohibited under international law).
326. Mamani v. Berzain, 654 F.3d 1148, 1155 (11th Cir. 2011).
[50:1
A Primer on Extrajudicial Killing
peoples.1327 In other words, a deliberated killing that is authorized
through such judicial proceedings does not constitute an extrajudicial
killing. The Eleventh Circuit's statement is also accurate if it is
referencing a second exception contained in the TVPA's text. According
to the TVPA, a deliberated killing "does not include any such killing
that, under international law, is lawfully carried out under the
authority of a foreign nation."32 In other words, a deliberated killing
that is lawfully carried out under international law does not constitute
an extrajudicial killing. If, however, the Eleventh Circuit's statement
that not all deliberated killings constitute an extrajudicial killing is not
limited to these two exceptions, this interpretation would be contrary
to the TVPA and international law.
Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit's approach to extrajudicial
killing moves far beyond the TVPA's text, legislative history, and
international law. For example, the Eleventh Circuit asserted that an
extrajudicial killing must be "undertaken with studied consideration
and purpose. '329 Offered with no explanation, this interpretation finds
no support in the text or legislative history of the TVPA. It is also
contrary to international law. It suggests a level of intentionality and
planning for an extrajudicial killing that is simply not required. 330
While some extrajudicial killings can take days or weeks of
preparation, others can happen with little planning and no warning.
Thus, there is no temporal element in the definition of extrajudicial
killing. The mens rea for extrajudicial killings does require an
intentional or negligent decision on the part of the perpetrator to act
or refrain from acting. But, this decision can be made with little
deliberation. Liability exists for individuals who knew or should have
known that death may result from their acts or omissions.
The Eleventh Circuit's puzzling approach is further evidenced
by the examples it provides of killings that do not meet its definition of
extrajudicial killing. Reviewing the plaintiffs' allegations, the court
indicated that the deaths could plausibly have been "the result of
precipitate shootings during an ongoing civil uprising," implying that
such deaths would not constitute extrajudicial killings.331 Similarly,
327. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, § 3(a), 106
Stat. 73 (1992).
328. Id.
329. Mamani, 654 F.3d at 1155.
330. At its most extreme, this requirement could absolve those who "shoot
first, ask questions later."
331. Id.
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the court indicated that an "accidental or negligent shooting (including
mistakenly identifying a target as a person who did pose a threat
to others)" would not constitute an extrajudicial killing. 332 These
examples also appeared in the district court's jury instructions. But, as
evidenced by international practice, these examples can sometimes
constitute extrajudicial killings. Human rights bodies have found
that precipitate shootings during public protests or even negligent
shootings can constitute extrajudicial killings when the state fails to
comply with the relevant standards on the use of force. 31 Such
shootings can also implicate the procedural component of the right to
life norm when a state fails to conduct a proper investigation.
Perhaps the Eleventh Circuit's approach to extrajudicial
killing can be understood in light of the limited factual allegations in
the Amended Consolidated Complaint as well as the plaintiffs' efforts
to establish the defendants' liability through the doctrine of command
responsibility. The court assessed the allegations in the Amended
Consolidated Complaint under the plausibility standard set forth in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal and found them lacking. 33 For example, the court
suggested the factual allegations in the Complaint could establish
liability for extrajudicial killing by the actual shooters.3 35 But the
Mamani complaint, the court noted, involved different allegations
against a different group of defendants. 336 "Plaintiffs have not pleaded
facts sufficient to show that anyone-especially these defendants, in
their capacity as high-level officials-committed extrajudicial killings
within the meaning of established international law. '337 The court also
expressed concern that government leaders could be accused based
solely on "bare assertions."
338
The Eleventh Circuit also seemed troubled that the claims of
extrajudicial killing were brought against high-ranking government
officials. For example, the court repeatedly referenced the Iqbal case,
which involved claims against high-ranking U.S. government officials,
and which the court found analogous to the claims in Mamani.339 In
332. Id.
333. INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS, supra note 154, at 73-79; SCHABAS II, supra
note 158, at 139-40, 151-53.
334. Mamani, 654 F.3d at 1153-56.
335. Id. at 1155.
336. Id.
337. Id. (emphasis in original).
338. Id. at 1154 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681).
339. Id. at 1153-56.
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addition, the court referenced the D.C. Circuit's decision in Belhas
v. Ya'alon, as well as the concurring opinion in that case, which
noted the plaintiffs had pointed "to no case where similar high-level
decisions on military tactics and strategy during a modern military
operation have been held to constitute ... extrajudicial killing under
international law."340 The Eleventh Circuit noted that the "[pilaintiffs
do not allege that a connection exists between the Defense Minister's
directing of where to fire weapons and the death of plaintiffs'
decedents.''341 And, the court rejected the possibility of strict liability
"for national leaders at the top of the long chain of command" if "some
soldiers or policemen committed wrongful acts ... "342
But, these statements prove too much. "I Command
responsibility has never required proof that military (or government)
leaders gave specific targeting orders to their subordinates. 344 Few
cases could ever meet this high evidentiary threshold. It would
certainly thwart the TVPA's stated purpose to require the production
of such detailed evidence, particularly when state actors are involved.
On several occasions, courts have shown reluctance to impose
heightened evidentiary requirements in cases of extrajudicial
killing. 341 And, as a legal matter, direct targeting orders are not
required to establish a claim of command responsibility.3 46 As stated
340. Id. at 1155 (quotingBelhas, 515 F.3d at 1293 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Williams,
J., concurring) (alteration in original)).
341. Id. at 1154.
342. Id.
343. Cf John W. Brooker, Ford v. Garcia: A Puzzling Fusion of the Command
Responsibility Doctrine with the Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 N.C. J. INT'L L. &
COM. REG. 701, 724 (2002) (concluding that an abundance of material suggests that
international law only requires plaintiffs to prove that a military leader exercised
de jure command).
344. See generally GUENAEL METTRAUX, THE LAW OF COMMAND
RESPONSIBILITY 129 (2009) (discussing the elements of the doctrine of superior
responsibility); Jamie Allan Williamson, Some Considerations on Command
Responsibility and Criminal Liability, 90 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 303, 306-12 (2008)
(detailing the conditions necessary for establishing command responsibility).
345. See, e.g., Han Kim v. Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 774 F.3d
1044, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 2014). In Han Kim, the D.C. Circuit acknowledged the
relationship between the TVPA and FSIA. It held that always requiring direct or
firsthand evidence of murder or torture would thwart the purpose of the FSIA. Id.
But see Sullivan v. Republic of Cuba, 289 F. Supp. 3d 231, 246 (D. Me. 2017)
(denying plaintiff relief for Cuba's extrajudicial killing of her father for failing to
meet the evidentiary standard).
346. This is also evident from the "knew or should have known language"
that is used for establishing command responsibility in international law. See, e.g.,
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in the TVPA's legislative history, "a higher official need not have
personally performed or ordered the abuses in order to be held
liable." 347 Moreover, a direct targeting order would implicate the
commander as a direct perpetrator, which represents a different theory
of liability.3
4
In addition, command responsibility does not impose strict
liability on commanders. 349 Plaintiffs must establish that the
commander knew or should have known that subordinates had
committed, were committing, or planned to commit human rights
abuses and that the commander failed to prevent the commission of
the crimes or failed to punish subordinates after the commission of the
crimes. 35' Thus, commanders are only responsible for their acts or
omissions when they knew or should have known of the abuses and
failed to act. There is no liability without fault.
3 5 1
Throughout its opinion, the Eleventh Circuit seems to
conflate the underlying claim (extrajudicial killing) with the theory of
liability (command responsibility). As noted, the court indicated the
"[clomplaint may possibly include factual allegations that seem
consistent with ATS liability for extrajudicial killing for someone: for
example, the shooters." 352 Presumably, this means the shooters
committed the killings "with studied consideration and purpose. ' '35 3 In
contrast, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had not pled sufficient
facts to show that "these defendants, in their capacity as high-level
Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 28(a)(i) ("That military commander or person
either knew or ... should have known that the forces were committing or about to
commit such crimes").
347. S. REP. No. 102-249, supra note 33, at 9.
348. CHANTAL MELONI, COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW 194-95, 209-12 (2009).
349. Brian Seth Parker, Applying the Doctrine of Superior Responsibility to
Corporate Officers: A Theory of Individual Liability for International Human Rights
Violations, 35 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 20-21 (2012); Timothy Wu &
Yong-Sung Kang, Criminal Liability for the Actions of Subordinates-The Doctrine
of Command Responsibility and its Analogues in United States Law, 38 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 272, 280-81, 292-93 (1997).
350. See generally MARIA L. NYBONDAS, COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY AND ITS
APPLICABILITY TO CIVILIAN SUPERIORS 30-38 (2010) (discussing the legal basis for
command responsibility); Jeremy Dunnaback, Note, Command Responsibility: A
Small-Unit Leader's Perspective, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1385, 1391-96 (2014)
(discussing the history and elements of command responsibility).
351. METTRAUX, supra note 344, at 223.
352. Mamani v. Berzain, 654 F.3d 1148, 1155 n.8 (11th Cir. 2011).
353. Id. at 1155.
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officials-committed extrajudicial killings within the meaning of
established international law."3 54 In support of this statement, the
court referenced Belhas v. Ya'alon and quoted from the concurring
opinion: "[Plaintiffs] point to no case where similar high-level
decisions on military tactics and strategy during a modern military
operation have been held to constitute... extrajudicial killing under
international law. "355
This passage is problematic for two reasons. First, it conflates
the underlying claim with the theory of liability. Command
responsibility requires a predicate act: in this case, an extrajudicial
killing.35 6 Once the predicate act has been established, a court must
then determine whether the commander can be held responsible for
this act. "There must be a 'nexus' between a commander's failure to
properly command and control his subordinates and the latter's
commission of crimes. ' '35 1 But the Eleventh Circuit never acknowledges
this distinction. In fact, the court never mentions command
responsibility in its opinion, even though this theory of liability
represented a critical aspect of the Amended Consolidated Complaint.
Second, this passage is also problematic because it disregards
decades of national and international jurisprudence regarding the
potential liability of commanders for the actions of their subordinates.
Many ATS and TVPA cases have established that "high-level officials"
can be held responsible for strategic decisions that lead to extrajudicial
killings. In Forti v. Suarez-Mason, for example, the U.S. district court
for the Northern District of California held that the ATS provided a
cause of action against an Argentine general for an extrajudicial killing
committed by military personnel under his command.3 58 In Xuncax v.
Gramajo, the U.S. district court for the District of Massachusetts found
a Guatemalan Defense Minister liable under the ATS and TVPA for
extrajudicial killings committed by military personnel under his
command.3 5 9 The Xuncax decision is particularly instructive because
it reviewed the TVPA's legislative history and rightly noted how
354. Id. (emphasis in original).
355. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Belhas v. Ya'alon, 515 F.3d 1279,
1293 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Williams, J., concurring)).
356. See Otto Triffterer, Article 28: Responsibility of Commanders and other
Superiors, in ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
COMMENTARY 1056, 1084 (Otto Triffterer & Kai Ambos eds., 3d ed. 2016).
357. Id. at 1087.
358. Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1540-42 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
359. Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 197-99 (D. Mass. 1995).
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command responsibility was considered by Congress as a distinct
theory of liability.360 Indeed, the TVPA's legislative history specifically
differentiates between the actions of the shooters and those of their
commanders. "Under international law, responsibility for torture,
summary execution, or disappearances extends beyond the person or
persons who actually committed those acts-anyone with higher
authority who authorized, tolerated or knowingly ignored those acts is
liable for them."3
61
Several circuit courts have made similar determinations. In
Kadic v. Karadzic, the Second Circuit held that the leader of the
Bosnian-Serb government in Bosnia-Herzegovina could be held
responsible for human rights abuses committed by military forces
under his command. 362 And in Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed a jury verdict against Ferdinand Marcos, the former
leader of the Philippines, for thousands of human rights abuses
committed by military and paramilitary forces under his command.
363
Both Kadic and Marcos accepted the theory of command responsibility
and its application to high-level officials. And both cases referenced the
same source in support, In re Yamashita, where the Supreme Court
determined that a military leader had an "affirmative duty" to "protect
prisoners of war and the civilian population" through control of his
subordinates.36 In sum, command responsibility is a well-recognized
principle of international law and one that has long been recognized in
U.S. legal proceedings, including ATS and TVPA cases.
B. Extrajudicial Killing in Mamani
A review of international practice reveals how the deaths in
Mamani meet the requirements for extrajudicial killing. Indeed, the
facts in this case are strikingly similar to several cases where human
rights bodies found the use of force against civilians to violate both the
360. Id. at 172 (quoting S. REP. No. 102-249, at 9 (1991)).
361. S. REP. No. 102-249, at 9 (footnote omitted).
362. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 236-37 (2d Cir. 1995).
363. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 787 (9th Cir. 1996).
364. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1946). See generally Jenny S.
Martinez, Understanding Mens Rea in Command Responsibility: From Yamashita
to Blaskic and Beyond, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 638, 648-50 (2007) (discussing the
evolution of the requirement of mens rea in the context of command responsibility);
Michael Schmitt, Yamashita, Medina, and Beyond: Command Responsibility in
Contemporary Military Operations, 164 MILITARY L. REV. 155, 177-81 (2000)
(looking at command responsibility as applied to U.S. domestic policy).
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substantive and procedural components of the prohibition against
extrajudicial killing.
1. The Substantive Component
To begin with, the use of force, whether lethal or not, must be
carefully regulated. 365 States are obligated to provide robust training
and careful planning to minimize potential harm to civilians.3 66
The intentional use of lethal force is only permissible when
"strictly unavoidable in order to protect life."367 It must be necessary
and proportionate. Significantly, security forces cannot automatically
resort to the use of lethal force when other options are available.3 68
When force is authorized, security forces must use restraint and seek
to minimize injury and loss of life. 369
These rules have practical consequences. Security forces may
not shoot indiscriminately into populated areas. 70 Indeed, the killing
of civilians who are hiding in their homes is a classic example of an
extrajudicial killing.37 ' Security forces may not use lethal force to
365. See generally INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS, supra note 154, at 73-74
(discussing the parameters of arbitrary executions); GENEVA ACADEMY, supra note
168, at 6 (discussing the three general principles that govern the use of force:
necessity, proportionality, and precaution); 2016 U.N. Special Rapporteur Report,
supra note 119, 51 (emphasizing the need of holding those who use force
accountable to domestic legal frameworks and international human rights law in
order to avoid abuse); 2014 Special Rapporteur Report, supra note 118, 65 (noting
that the use of force must also "meet the requirement of proportionality").
366. See Nadege Dorzema v. Dominican Republic, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 251, 81-85, 87 (Oct. 24, 2012) (outlining
the principles that must be adhered to when determining whether to use force);
Montero-Aranguren v. Venezuela, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 150, 67-68 (July 5, 2006)
(explaining the general principles surrounding the right to life).
367. 2014 Special Rapporteur Report, supra note 118, 58; 1990 U.N. Basic
Principles, supra note 107, Principle 9; GENEVA ACADEMY, supra note 168, 13-14.
368. 2014 Special Rapporteur Report, supra note 118, [ 59-62; 1990 U.N.
Basic Principles, supra note 107, Principle 4; 1989 U.N. Principles, supra note 96,
4; GENEVA ACADEMY, supra note 168, at 6-7.
369. 2014 Special Rapporteur Report, supra note 118, $ 65; 1989 U.N.
Principles, supra note 96; GENEVA ACADEMY, supra note 168, at 7-8.
370. This prohibition also applies in times of armed conflict. See, e.g.,
Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 145, at 37-40 (explaining the prohibition
against indiscriminate attacks in armed conflicts).
371. See generally Case of the Caracazo v. Venezuela, Merits, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 58, 42 (Nov. 11, 1999) (finding that Venezuela was responsible
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disperse unarmed protestors.3 12 They may not use lethal force against
individuals who pose no risk or threat.3 7 3 They also may not shoot at
non-threatening individuals simply because others may pose a
threat. 374 Even individuals who may pose some risk to the general
public or to security forces are still entitled to protection .
5
Significantly, the use of force may be considered arbitrary and
a violation of international law even if security forces did not
deliberately target a victim. Extrajudicial killings can be established
in the absence of an official plan or explicit orders that security forces
target specific individuals. Similarly, extrajudicial killings can be
established even when the actual shooter has not been identified.
376
Finally, security forces are required to abide by the prohibition against
extrajudicial killing in times of civil disturbances or armed conflict.
3 77
In Mamani, Bolivian security forces failed to abide by the
international norms regulating the use of lethal force. They
intentionally targeted some victims, and others were killed by
indiscriminate fire. Their actions resulted in multiple deaths. The use
of force did not comply with the principles of necessity, distinction,
proportionality, and precaution. The use of force was unnecessary;
there was no effort to distinguish lawful targets from innocent
civilians; the force used was not proportionate to the perceived threat;
and no precautions were taken to prevent the loss of life.
for causing the deaths of 276 individuals through indiscriminate firing and
extrajudicial executions).
372. Umetaliev v. Kyrgyzstan, Commc'n No. 1275/2004, Hum. Rts. Comm.,
9.1-12 (Oct. 30, 2008); 2014 Special Rapporteur Report, supra note 118, 75.
373. See generally Gul v. Turkey, App. No. 22676/93, Eur. Ct. H.R., 77
(2000) (finding that the firing of 50-55 shots at a door, behind which complainant
stood, was a disproportionate use of force in regard to the threat posed); Suarez de
Guerrero v. Colombia, Commc'n No. 45/1979 (Hum. Rts. Comm. Mar. 31, 1982)
(finding that complainants were intentionally deprived of their right to life and that
such force was unnecessary to effect an arrest or prevent escape).
374. Solomou and Others v. Turkey, App. No. 36832/97, 77-78 (Eur. Ct.
H.R. 2008); 2014 Special Rapporteur Report, supra note 118, 75.
375. Neira Alegria v. Peru, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 20, 74 (Jan. 19, 1995).
376. Gtileg v. Turkey, App. No. 54/1997/838/1044, q 68-73 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
July 27, 1998).
377. 2014 Special Rapporteur Report, supra note 118, [1; SCHABAS II, supra
note 158, at 153; BURGORGUE-LARSEN & UBEDA DE TORRES, supra note 158, at
334-35.
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2. The Procedural Component
The prohibition against extrajudicial killing includes a
procedural component. Meaningful investigations must be conducted
when a potentially wrongful death occurs.3 18 Individuals responsible
for these deaths must be held accountable through a criminal
process.3 7 9 Proceedings must be effective, transparent, and impartial.
Punishment must be commensurate with the offense. In addition,
victims are entitled to reparations, including compensation. 3 0 The
government is obligated to disclose the truth of what happened and
take steps to ensure that the violations are not repeated."
In Mamani, no meaningful investigations or prosecutions
occurred after the use of force. Innocent civilians were killed with no
commensurate accountability. By authorizing the use of force in
security operations that targeted a civilian population and by failing to
investigate or prosecute anyone for the ensuing deaths, the Mamani
defendants are properly subject to liability for extrajudicial killing
under the TVPA and international law.
CONCLUSION
In Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, the Supreme Court held that
foreign corporations are not subject to civil liability under the Alien
Tort Statute. Jesner represents the latest restriction on ATS claims by
the Supreme Court. With the continuing decline of the ATS as a viable
mechanism for redress, the TVPA will become even more important for
addressing claims of extrajudicial killing. Moreover, the TVPA's ability
to address extrajudicial killings in the context of genocide, war crimes,
and crimes against humanity further highlights its unique role
in promoting accountability. TVPA case law will also affect the
378. Nadege Dorzema v. Dominican Republic, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 251, q 101 (Oct. 24, 2012);
Montero-Aranguren v. Venezuela, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 150, 1 79 (July 5, 2006); see also Economic
and Social Council Res. 1989/65, supra note 96, at Principle 9 (requiring
investigation of extra-legal, arbitrary and summary executions and specifying
certain factors that such an investigation must fulfill).
379. Florentina Olmedo v. Paraguay, Commc'n No. 1828/2008, 7.3 (Hum.
Rts. Comm. Mar. 22, 2012); Mocanu v. Romania, App. Nos. 10865/09, 45886/07, and
32431/08, 316 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 17, 2014).
380. Minnesota Protocol, supra note 103, at 4-5.
381. Id.
2018]
COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW
interpretation of other statutes that reference extrajudicial killing,
such as the FSIA.3 82 Accordingly, it is essential for courts to interpret
the TVPA as Congress intended-consistent with U.S. obligations
under international human rights law and as a mechanism for
providing a civil remedy to victims of extrajudicial killing.
383
When confronted with TVPA claims, courts must not rely on a
stilted interpretation of the statute and must engage in a more rigorous
analysis of international law. 38 4 By moving beyond codification and
into the realm of international practice, courts will find a robust
jurisprudence that can help them determine when death becomes
murder.
382. Han Kim v. Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 774 F.3d 1044, 1045,
1047 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
383. Torture Victim Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992).
384. Several courts have cited the Eleventh Circuit's limited approach to
deliberated killings; see, e.g., Fritz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 15-456 (RDM),
2018 WL 3687959, at *25 (D.D.C. Aug. 2, 2018) (holding that plaintiffs met the
standard for "deliberated" only because they demonstrated a militant group could
not have conducted an attack with the support and direction of the government of
Iran); Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 864 F.3d 751, 770 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (adopting the
Eleventh Circuit's limited definition of "deliberated" from Mamani v. Berzain, 645
F.3d 1148, 1148 (11th Cir. 2011)).
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